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Special Issue

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace

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A new argument on the predicament of our age, by Leon Wieseltier

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Correspondence

Ted's Power Base

To the editors:

Morton Kondracke's conclusion that Ted Kennedy is already positioning himself for a run for the Presidency in 1988 ("The Democrats After Ted," TNR, December 27, 1982) overlooks what I believe is an important point. Kennedy's Senate term expires that year. If he runs for President and loses, he will have forfeited his power base in the Senate.

JEFFREY BENDIX
Cleveland Heights, Ohio

Punishing Draft Resisters

To the editors:

Among the four draft registration resisters noted in your editorial "Resisters Without A Draft" (TNR, December 13, 1982) was Mark Schmucker, who "drew two years of mandatory work in a home for mentally retarded adults and a $4,000 fine." The Reagan Administration has slashed funding for human services, but the most personalized evidence it has provided to date of its insensitivity to the plight of the disadvantaged is that it deems working with the mentally retarded a fitting "punishment" (and deterrent) for those who would practice nonviolent acts of civil disobedience.

DAVID A. HOLCOMB
Appleton, Wisconsin

Cop The Presses

To the editors:

Thank you for your review of *UnAmerican Activities* ("Agents Provocateurs," TNR, November 22, 1982), about the government's harassment of the so-called underground and antiwar press in the 1960s.

Angus Mackenzie, one of the authors of the book, used documents he obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, and proved that the F.B.I. had set fire to the office building of Liberation News Service in Washington, D.C., in 1967, in the middle of the night—although the agents must have known that L.N.S. staff members were asleep there. I was one of those editors, and I remember being awakened by a runaway who'd been sleeping in a closet. I never knew the deliberate nature of the blaze until reading Mackenzie's article years after the fact. (It originally appeared in the *Columbia Journalism Review*, March, 1981).

In 1967 L.N.S. was an extended family of friends who didn't constitute any real threat to the Republic. That the F.B.I., C.I.A., Army CoInTel, and State Department all considered us dangerous enough to warrant full-time surveillance indicates these agencies' astonishing naiveté. The C.I.A. investigated L.N.S. on the grounds that we might be receiving funding from Russia, China, or Cuba; meanwhile, we lived in slums and couldn't afford a movie ticket. Yet, they tried to kill us. They didn't like what we were publishing. Never mind that our best equipment was an arthritic offset press, and our readers mostly strays. We also sold our dispatches to *Time*, and in tandem with *Ramparts* and other sympathetic magazines, we occasionally reached several million readers with a single piece. Our stuff was amateurish, stridently antiwar, and anti-U.S. government. Why should it surprise me now that the same government decided to bump me off?

But it does, somehow.

RAYMOND MUNGO
Haiku, Maui

IT'S A FOREST WITH ALL THE MAKINGS OF A FAIRY TALE. EXCEPT THE HAPPY ENDING.
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
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TRB®

FROM WASHINGTON

Congressional Disarray

There is a certain reckless abandon about an adjourning Congress; they get to knocking over the spittoons. The spectacle is equaled in no other legislative body on earth. We have come through another Congressional departure here, and the nation, thank heavens, survives. "Do you have any complaints about Congress as an institution and its performance?" ABC's David Brinkley ironically asked of Representative Henry Reuss, Democrat of Wisconsin, who, after twenty-eight years, is leaving. "Not if you view Congress as what it is," replied Reuss. "Congress is really not capable of governing."

Is this really true, or is Reuss just indulging in the same hyperbole as Congress itself? I switched my shortwave radio to the BBC World Service and smiled at the imperturbable analyst with the British accent trying to make sense of what was happening in Washington. "Obviously the system of government is under a strain," he said guardedly after making an effort or two at explaining the Senate veto of the House, the House veto of the Senate, and the President's threat to veto everybody. For Brinkley's American audience, Senator Pat Moynihan, always a refreshing voice, explained, "We have a budget process now which no one understands, and it doesn't work." On CBS's "Face the Nation," House Majority Leader Jim Wright tried to put it all in perspective: "The Congress of the United States," he said, "is in many ways the most fascinating human institution on earth. It can be frustrating, but it is fascinating. It can rise to heights of sparkling statesmanship. It can sink also to levels of crass mediocrity." Exactly so. Congress showed off its versatility last week. It killed immigration control. It left the MX homeless. It will pass budget appropriations (probably) in six to nine months. Things will continue on more or less as they have been doing, and we shall survive.

Why is Congress like that? The Founding Fathers, fearful of a king's rule, scattered veto powers all through Washington. A young political scientist named Woodrow Wilson saw the problem one hundred years ago, and wrote: "The federal government lacks strength because its powers are divided, lacks promptness because its authorities are multiplied, lacks wieldiness because its processes are roundabout, lacks efficiency because its responsibility is indistinct and its action without competent direction."

A lot of people would like to tighten the system, but the effort to do so by constitutional amendment is almost impossible. However grave the structural weaknesses of the American government, they "are quite beyond the reach of reformers," says James L. Sundquist in a recent Brookings study, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress*. Maybe a governmental breakdown or catastrophe? Yes, that might do it, he says, but nothing short of that. Look at the amendment process: there are two routes, by Congress or by the states through a convention. The amendment process is formidable. A proposal can be blocked by one-third-plus-one of the membership of either Senate or House, and if it scrambles over *that* obstacle, three-fourths of the states must concur (either through legislatures or through conventions called for the purpose). So one-eighth of the state legislative bodies can block it (i.e., one house in each of thirteen states). Whew! You really have to take the nearly two-hundred-year-old instrument apart to realize its solidity. Given the sanctity of the grand old instrument, and the fear of unexpected consequences if it were changed, it seems almost impossible that any basic alteration will be made.

But surely something can be done. This past week has hardly shown Congress at its best as a deliberative body. Emergency cots were set up in anterooms. As Senator Bob Dole, chairman of the Finance Committee, recalls the late-

continued on page 47

Most professionals know more than they can say.

In meeting the challenges their work presents, the best professionals rely less on the formulas learned in graduate school than on the kind of improvisation learned in practice. This unarticulated, largely unexamined process is the subject of Donald Schön's path-breaking book. Through detailed observation of five professions—engineering, architecture, management, psychotherapy, and town planning—he shows how "reflection-in-action" actually works and suggests ways to foster this vital creativity in future professionals.



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THE NEW REPUBLIC
JANUARY 10 & 17, 1983

LAME DUCK BLUES

For some years now, our beloved colleague TRB has been campaigning, from his soapbox on the page opposite, in favor of basic change in the mechanics of the American constitutional system. We have tended to be skeptical; but after seeing how the United States government functioned during the lame duck session of Congress, we are beginning to think that he may have a point. For the Senate to be prevented from acting because of a filibuster by a handful of members, for grown men and women to be staying up all night as though they were sophomores cramming for exams, for federal workers to have to check the radio to see whether the government would be operating on Monday morning—such unedifying shenanigans leave little room for wonder at why the American people increasingly despair of their political system. All of this is petty, however, compared to the consequences if the American political system fails to save the Social Security system from financial chaos. Social Security has become a bedrock institution, a testament to the willingness of one generation of Americans to help another—indeed, to the willingness of all Americans to help each other. And Social Security is one of the great success stories of American government. It has saved millions from living lives of grinding poverty, and has reassured tens of millions more that there is something they can rely on.

Now the system is in trouble. The old-age fund had to borrow in November to send out checks, and if nothing is done checks will be delayed in going out next summer. If that happens, if the checks aren't there when people expect them, great damage will be done to the credibility of the system. But even if Congress closes the current $25 billion annual gap, Social Security faces a long-term problem of changed demographics. In 2010, less than thirty years from now, the baby-boom generation will begin retiring, but the far smaller post-baby-boom generation will be supporting its old age. In 1950 there were sixteen workers paying Social Security taxes to support each retired person. Nowadays the ratio is three to one, and in 2010 it will be two to one.

When polls are taken of young Americans, they overwhelmingly say they do not believe that a Social Security system will exist by the time they retire. This bespeaks a profound cynicism, a belief that America cannot keep its promises to its people. And it raises the possibility that America really will be unable to keep its promises, because if young people do not believe they will draw the benefits, why should they be willing to pay the taxes? The danger that is posed is of a new and shameful kind of divisiveness in society, a social war between old and young—which the old are bound to lose, to the detriment of the whole society.

The dilemma of Social Security is not like that of the MX or El Salvador or the world economy. There is no conundrum, no mystery about how to solve it. The remedies are known to the Social Security Commission headed by Alan Greenspan that recently failed to reach agreement on a report to President Reagan. They are known to Congress, to the President, and to everyone else who has studied the problem. They were described in this magazine two weeks ago by Bob Kuttner (see "The Social Security Hysteria," TNR, December 27, 1982), and they could be recited even by William F. Buckley of *National Review* (who by the way, no longer favors making Social Security voluntary).

The solutions are: (1) Stop indexing Social Security to prices, which overstate the needs of old people, and tie them instead to average wages in the country, which represent the true and fair measure of the society's ability to support its aged population. (2) Make Social Security benefits taxable as other income is, a far better solution than converting Social Security into a means-tested welfare system, because such programs are always the first to be cut. (3) Extend mandatory Social Security coverage to employees of the federal government and of nonprofit organizations. (4) Phase in a later retirement age. (5) Raise Social Security taxes.

The classic problem with Social Security is, of course, that Democrats hate to cut benefits and Republicans hate to raise taxes. Because the Republican President

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and the Democratic Speaker of the House could not agree on a compromise last year, they appointed the Greenspan commission to come up with recommendations. Now Democrats and Republicans on that commission are divided, and are waiting for cues from Mr. Reagan and Mr. O'Neill. This is Alfonse and Gaston raised to proportions that would be laughable were they not potentially tragic.

It is the business of political leaders to lead, and the time for that is now. It is time for Mr. Reagan to place a discreet phone call to Mr. O'Neill and to begin a process of compromise that involves both tax increases and benefit adjustments. Because we are in a deep recession and inflation is low, cost-of-living adjustments can be imposed now without pain for current recipients. Tax increases ought to be kept small for the time being in order not to hinder recovery from the recession. But gradually more money must be raised, and Social Security benefits must be pared. Both Democrats and Republicans know this is so, but they do not want to face the political pain of doing it. They must, or the pain suffered by the political system will be dreadful.

Max Lerner At 80

Max Lerner's romance with America is almost as old as he is, and this week he turns 80. Born in the Pale of Settlement to which Russia's Jews were confined, Mr. Lerner came here when he was very young, but not so young as to forget the wretchedness of life under the Czar, the terrors of the crossing, or the wonders of the New World. The exuberance evoked by these wonders —the wonders of freedom, mostly—has never deserted him. His is an immigrant's patriotism, matched in its subtlety and intensity among public people of our age only by that of Felix Frankfurter.

As a student at Yale Mr. Lerner began his lifelong rejection of the artificial boundaries imposed on the intellect by academic departments. He went on to the fledgling Brookings Institution, and by the age of 25 he was managing editor of the unparalleled (and unreplaced) *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*—a monument to Alvin Johnson's initial vision, of course, but also to the relentless curiosity and high standards of this passionate, risk-taking, but scrupulous young scholar.

The scholarly world, however, did not contain him. Mr. Lerner's seminal writing in legal theory and constitutional history—on John Marshall and Oliver Wendell Holmes, on the Court and capitalism—had an influence quite beyond the politics classes and law schools where, often furtively, they were read. In any case, he was by then an editor at *The Nation* and, as such, a party to liberalism's infatuation with Stalinism. For Mr. Lerner this happened only once and lasted but a short time, in contrast to those for whom the emergence of Stalin's heirs, like Mao and Ho and Fidel, became an occasion for a recrudescence of old revolutionary ardors and a concommitant callousness about freedom. Mr. Lerner now speaks of those days and of this intellectual and moral mistake without a hint of the confessional mode, eager that others, equally fervent for justice, not replicate the error in its contemporary guises. From his experience in the ethical netherworld of Marxism—and of Marxism embattled against Fascism—he learned deeply the limits, the ambiguities, and the possibilities of democratic power. But the struggle against wrongs does require power, and Lerner has unabashedly been for powerful democracies when friends and former allies still wished them to be innocent and powerless. When McCarthyism cast its shadow over the land, Mr. Lerner engaged its punitive hysterics fiercely but without ever confusing victimization with virtue.

Never an establishment academic, he went from Harvard to Williams to Sarah Lawrence to Brandeis. There he wrote his monumental *America as a Civilization*, his update of Toqueville and Bryce, and his personal response to the gloomy Marxian forebodings of his old friend, the British socialist Harold Laski. In text and in courses, Mr. Lerner laid the intellectual foundations and erected a sound structure for the one genuine success of multidisciplinary work in the social sciences: American Studies. It is his field.

To encompass America, that fabulously inchoate ideal in reality, he made himself expert in all that expressed and touched the Americans, how we work and play and grow up and grieve and love. In a vivid and vigorous syndicated column that was a continuing education for his readers (some thought it a continuing provocation to them) but that never made him an establishment journalist, either, he grappled with ideas and their consequences. Never smug, alive to controversy, alert to freshness, learned as more professorial types are not, he grapples still.

Editor's Note

Leon Wieseltier's "The Great Nuclear Debate," to which most of this special expanded issue of THE NEW REPUBLIC is devoted, is the longest article this journal has published in the nearly seventy years of its existence. No subject is more urgent, and none is more urgently in need of clear thinking. Politically the debate has been joined by the great public; but intellectually it has been left largely to the preachers of sermons and to the planners of wars. It is this gap that Mr. Wieseltier aims to fill. He takes on the counselors of despair, whether their counsel is in the name of peace or victory, and returns the debate to its intellectual and moral fundamentals. What he seeks is a new defense of deterrence—the worst method of keeping the peace except for all the others.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

THE GREAT NUCLEAR DEBATE

BY LEON WIESELTIER

How immensely simplified the world is when it is examined for its worthiness for destruction.

—WALTER BENJAMIN

A GREAT DEBATE IS TAKING PLACE IN the West, where it can take place. The subject is the prevention of nuclear war. That nuclear war is damnation, everybody agrees. The horrors held out by nuclear weapons have been harrowingly described. Thermal pulse, blast wave, radiation fallout; air bursts and ground bursts; the fast deaths and the slow; the destruction of culture and the destruction of nature—the popular imagination is now filled with the infernal images. But the debate must not stop with the descriptions. It must start with them. They do not, these chronicles of carnage that are placed before the public, concentrate the mind wonderfully, like the prospect of only a hanging; they do not, in many cases, concentrate the mind at all. They only fill it with fear, when it was already afraid. Fear has been our fate since 1945. We do not need to be called to the feeling. It animates the policymakers as well as the protesters. Who is *for* nuclear war?

The fear of nuclear war—the most intelligent feeling of our time—has once again taken the form of a mass movement, with men, women, and children demanding not to be incinerated. The demand is moral, but it is also quite general. The same may be said of many of the demands of the movement's intellectuals. They linger long over the consequences of a nuclear exchange, and then leap to visions of a better world. They write beautifully about the fate of the species and the fate of the earth. But nuclear war will not be prevented by poetry or philosophy; it will be prevented by policy. Whatever else the bomb is, it is a practical problem. It demands solutions, not merely sentiments; and it demands solutions that are not sure to be simple. There comes a point in the discussion of this very grave subject when eloquence is egregious, when it must be replaced by a cool and careful consideration of the danger in all its details. If there is anything as foolish as not thinking about nuclear weapons, it is not thinking about them enough.

There are those, of course, who think about nuclear weapons all the time, whose profession it is to think about them. These are the defense intellectuals, and the nuclear debate must not be left to them, either. The scientists who produce the weapons and the strategists who plan for their use have no particular competence in the matter of preserving living things in life and human beings in history. All that they can tell us is what the weapons are. They have no special moral or political authority for having made them. Indeed, they are too much with them, too much at ease in the weapons' world. And they are utterly in thrall to the imperatives of technology; they invent first and ask questions later. What stands in their way, however, is the political system in which they live. They must seek approval in

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the society for their designs and their devices. Physics is not policy; nor is engineering; nor is strategy. In a democracy even the matter of national security must come before the public. Sooner or later research and development must be justified. The stirring of popular opinion against the arms race really represents democracy's challenge to technocracy. The position of the United States on nuclear weapons will be made in the town hall and the think tank. There are those who believe that this is a mixed blessing, that defense is too difficult a matter for democracies. It is a difficult matter; and it is made no easier by the trouble that democracies have believing in the existence of their enemies. Yet the alternative is an unmixed curse, a society in which nobody can oppose the military and its mystifications because nobody can oppose anything. It may irk the defense establishment that its conclusions are not final, that it must carry its case before an untutored citizenry; but it is precisely the participation of all the people in all deliberations of public concern—in sum, an open society—that the defense establishment was established to defend.

THE NUCLEAR DEBATE, then, has been too frequently diverted by the wrong kinds of discourse. It has consisted largely in fantasies that will profit us nothing and facts that we cannot quite understand. The citizens of this nation, and of the nations of NATO, are trapped between visionaries and experts. They are given sermons or systems analysis.

Nor is that all. The nuclear debate has been infected by ideology. It had to happen; the ideologization of intellectual life in the United States is virtually complete. Almost the only views that are heard are world views. Political positions come in packages. Everything is said to be connected to everything else; or, as the theorists of the left used to put it, critical thinking is dominated on all sides by a concept of totality. According to *The Nation*, it follows from your opposition to the war in Vietnam that you oppose the free market, or the patriarchal family, or Camp David. According to *Commentary*, it follows from your opposition to the Soviet Union that you oppose environmentalism, or Jacobo Timerman, or homosexuality. Of course these things do not follow. (A man may hate Communism in the arms of another man.) To a certain extent the New Left was undone precisely by its extravagant ideological entailments; most Americans were unwilling to go the doctrinal distance. The New Right (the neoconservatives included) will be similarly undone. Many intellectuals, and even more politicians, will resist the regimentation.

Meanwhile the nuclear question is slapped into the service of the left and the right. The argument against an arms race has been placed under the sign of the sixties. The radical raptures of fifteen years ago, many of which were refuted by Soviet foreign policy and rejected by American public opinion, are said to have found an heir. Antinuclear activists speak as if the long dark night of the left is finally over. There is a peace movement again. And, like its predecessor, it is in the throes of a great ideological expansion. Nuclear weapons, it turns out, are not the real problem; they are only its most parlous expression. The real problem is America's ambitions. These ambitions are deemed to be the present danger to this country and to the world. Thus, many things come with the antinuclear position—neutralism, pacifism, and isolationism, to name a few. It is not only arms that must be controlled, so must American power.

The argument for an uncontrolled arms race, on the other hand, is an argument for uncontrolled American power. For the Reagan Administration, too, and for its intellectuals, nuclear weapons are not the real problem. The real problem is the Soviet Union's ambitions. These ambitions are deemed to be the present danger to this country and to the world. It is not far from this to a pro-nuclear position. The prevention of nuclear war, it is said, must take place in the context of the prevention of Soviet expansion. A nuclear strategy follows, as the night the day, from anti-Communism. Those who speak of disarmament, and even of peace, are "objectively" pro-Soviet. There is no way that the United States can limit or reduce the nuclear weapons in its possession, it is said, without playing into the hands of the Kremlin.

THERE IS NO GAINSAYING that the nuclear question cannot be addressed except in the thick of present political reality. Too many advocates of disarmament speak as if the issue is somehow too big for politics. They believe that the making of nuclear weapons was a revolution in human affairs; their unmaking, therefore, will also require a revolution ("the revolution in thought and in action if mankind is to go on living," in Jonathan Schell's discouraging words). This is a view of reality that is completely determined by technology. For these peace people, as for the military planners they detest, history begins with the bomb, even as it may end with it. All other considerations—especially the contest between the values of democracy and the values of totalitarianism—are irrelevant.

The surprising thing about life since Hiroshima, however, is the extent to which it has not changed. There has been a great deal of moral and political continuity. Nor can this be all attributed to denial. The nuclear peril has never been really denied, as Schell and others have claimed. (The notion of denial, though, is a useful way to discredit psychologically the views of those with whom you disagree.) It has just never taken over. People went on living for the old purposes, and politics remained as premised on these purposes as it ever was. The values of democracy were still good, and the values of totalitarianism were still evil. The struggle between democracy and totalitarianism did not end in 1945, because it is a struggle between different answers to some of the most fundamental questions of human life. The nuclear danger has not robbed these questions of their urgency.

Nuclear weapons may destroy the world and totalitarianism may ruin it. It is an abdication of responsibility

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and an admission of defeat to argue that both cannot be beaten. We need not fight suicide at the risk of slavery, as some "doves" would have us do, nor slavery at the risk of suicide, as some "hawks" would have us do. The antinuclear argument is too important to be conceded to the one, and the anti-Communist argument is too important to be conceded to the other. The arguments belong together, not in the world of ideology, but in the world of politics. The anti-Communist argument reminds us that there are forms of disarmament from which people may suffer—the loss of their freedoms, certainly, and maybe also the loss of their lives. And the antinuclear argument reminds us that democracy may adopt certain means in its struggle against totalitarianism that will destroy it, too.

What is necessary is to proceed with the historically urgent task of nuclear disarmament in a manner that will not have the slightest effect upon the historically urgent task of resisting the Russians. Of course this must not be merely stated, but shown. Yet first the nuclear controversy must be uncluttered, and some misconceptions on both sides removed. What is essential to the argument against nuclear weapons, and what is not? What are the real philosophical and political implications of the fear of nuclear war?

I.

The Party Of Peace

THE PEACE MOVEMENT OF THE 1980s began in Western Europe and spread to the United States. The immediate occasion for the antinuclear agitation in Western Europe was the 1979 NATO decision to install medium-range nuclear missiles, the Pershing II and the cruise, targeted on the Soviet Union; these would match, in range and in accuracy, the SS-20 missiles that the Soviet Union already had targeted on Western Europe. (112 cruise missiles are to be placed in Italy, 160 in Britain, 48 in Belgium, 48 in Holland, and 96 in West Germany. Germany is also to receive 108 Pershings.) This NATO decision had the appearance of lowering what is called the nuclear threshold; that is, it seemed to make the prospect of nuclear war more likely by basing the defense of Western Europe upon nuclear weapons whose smaller size made them less inhibiting to use. When President Reagan spoke casually to reporters about a limited nuclear war in Europe, the fears of many Europeans were confirmed. Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, and in some countries—Germany especially—they became a formidable political force. They were not united, however, behind a single antinuclear position. Many things were proposed: the repeal of the NATO decision, or the return of the Pershings and the cruises after they are installed (in 1983); the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe—in Central Europe, or in the Baltic, or even "from Poland to Portugal"; unilateral nuclear disarmament, to which Britain's Labour Party is now officially committed; and multilateral nuclear disarmament, probably through negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

IN THE UNITED STATES the occasion for the peace movement was its new President's picture of the world. In the name of a really metaphysical confidence in America, he appeared quite willing to wage a nuclear war. (It must be said in fairness to Mr. Reagan that his predecessor, who was known for his homilies about nuclear horrors, was responsible for Presidential Directive 59, issued in July 1980—as ominous a document as any produced by the present Administration.) Mr. Reagan spoke of controlling nuclear war, not of controlling arms. He seemed to think that nuclear wars can be won. The agency for arms control was assigned to a man who had spent the past decade peddling ideological justifications for the arms race. More generally, the President stood for a vision of America in which power had pride of place. This vision was perfectly expressed in his budget, which called for a radical expansion of the military and a radical contraction of everything else. Secretary of State Alexander Haig mumbled something to Congress about a nuclear demonstration shot, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger drafted plans, called the Defense Guidance, for a "protracted" nuclear war. Here, too, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, and here, too, the political climate was changed. It now appears that politicians will not be able to ignore the antinuclear anxiety of the people. The most popular antinuclear proposal is the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution, calling for "a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and future deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems." In the elections of 1982, freeze referendums were approved in eight (out of nine) states and in twenty-eight cities and counties. Many antinuclear activists, however, are not satisfied with the freeze, and speak of more dramatic forms of disarmament.

The peace movement is an eruption from below. It has about it an aspect of the popular will. Individuals with otherwise divergent political ideas and interests have realized that the existence of nuclear weapons transforms the citizenry of this country into a single community of fate. They share a presentiment about what is being prepared for them. The fear is absolutely faultless. But it is not only fear upon which the peace movement is founded. Its intellectuals argue from something more. They advance certain moral and historical judgments that do their cause no justice. It is these other propositions of the peace movement that must be examined.

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This concern about nuclear catastrophe must be rid of certain political constructions that are placed upon it; they originate elsewhere.

Nuclear weapons are not like other weapons. The difference was recognized, as early as 1946, by Bernard Brodie, who wrote with great wisdom that "thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose." This is the doctrine of deterrence, upon which defense policy in the nuclear age has been based. The doctrine of deterrence is the exact opposite of the doctrine of use. The distinction between deterrence and use, however, is not the only thing that the intellectuals of the peace movement have in mind when they insist upon the difference between nuclear arms and conventional arms. They have in mind, rather, a broader, and more momentous, distinction. The problem of nuclear weapons, they maintain, calls for nothing less than a new analysis of history.

Jonathan Schell makes the call, though he does not make the analysis. "Everything has changed," he announces. Human history may be periodized according to the appearance in it of the bomb; and the period after the appearance of the bomb, Schell explains, is characterized not merely by the fear of death, but by the fear of "the death of death." The change, in other words, is spiritual, and it is to the realm of the spirit that Schell repairs. It is with "Gandhi's law of love" and little else that he leaves the endangered human species. He writes of "a fundamental divorce between the prenuclear basis of our whole approach to political life and the reality of our nuclear world"; but about the manner of a post-nuclear return of politics to reality we are told nothing, except that the system of sovereign states must be dissolved in favor of a world government. "The peril of extinction is the price that the world pays . . . for its insistence on continuing to divide itself up into sovereign nations. . . . Our present system and the institutions that make it up are the debris of history. They have become inimical to life and must be swept away." This is an old idea; Einstein declared that "there is only *one* path to peace and security: the path of supranational organization." This is also something more than the idea of an international authority for atomic energy, which Neils Bohr proposed to Churchill in 1944, and which was embodied in the Baruch Plan, an American plan of moral merit. (The Soviets wouldn't hear of it.) Schell wants nothing less than "to reinvent politics, to reinvent the world." If that is what it will take to master the nuclear menace, however, we may all start living for the day, because we will surely die. Schell's book is a classic of irresponsible idealism.

A new analysis of history based upon the nuclear difference may be found, rather, in the writings of E.P. Thompson, the British social historian. Thompson may be considered the most influential intellectual in the peace movement. In 1980 he published his pamphlet "Protest and Survive," which became the manifesto of the antinuclear movements in England and in Europe; last year he published a version of it as "A Letter to America" in *The Nation*. Thompson's arguments for disarmament—he is a practiced publicist—may all be found in his recent book, *Beyond the Cold War*.

The real distinction between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, according to Thompson, is that nuclear weapons are not instruments of intention. They are, instead, makers of it. Conventional weapons are mere things, manipulated by men; the men must be understood, therefore, and not the things. In the world of conventional weapons, military facts must be broken down into political facts, into the ideas and interests that motivate the elite whom the military serves. Not so in the world of nuclear weapons. They are not things; they are systems. The production, deployment, and support of these weapons systems generates "a correspondent social system"—an organization of knowledge that leads to an organization of the economy that leads to an organization of society. What began with the splitting of the atom ended with the national security state. Nuclear weapons have a logic of their own, which eventually imposes itself upon every sector of society. The bomb defines the character of the society. And this character Thompson defines as "exterminism."

EXTERMINISM, in Thompson's words, is an "order whose institutional base is the weapons-system, and the entire economic, scientific, political, and ideological support-system to that weapons-system—the social system which researches, 'chooses' it, produces it, polices it, justifies it, and maintains it in being." There are, of course, only two such systems in existence—the United States and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers are distinguished by what Thompson calls an "isomorphism"; each is thrust by "its economy, its polity, and its ideology" in a direction "whose outcome must be the extermination of multitudes." "The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. do not *have* military-industrial complexes: they *are* such complexes"; for that reason, he concludes, "isomorphic replication is evident at every level: in cultural, political, but above all, in ideological life."

All these pseudo-scientific sonorities amount to this: that the United States and the Soviet Union are the devil and the deep blue sea. The nuclear power they share has eclipsed the differences between them. The choice that now confronts the world is not between capitalism and Communism, or between democracy and totalitarianism; it is the choice between extermination and survival. And so Thompson utters the silly remark that "the movement of Polish Solidarity is, in a critical sense, *of the same kind* as the movement in West Europe to resist nuclear rearmament." Schell, too, equally certain that the nuclear weapon is the essential characteristic of both the United States and the Soviet Union, compares Brezhnev's way of dealing with his critics to Nixon's; he speaks of an "alliance of the champions of peace in

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repression." Where there are nuclear weapons, in short, there are no rights.

"Isomorphism," in the sphere of politics, means neutralism. There is no need to take sides in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union if it makes no difference who wins. The resurgence that neutralism has enjoyed in Europe is owed in large measure to this association with the antinuclear argument. Neutralism—or, as Thompson prefers, "internationalism"—is presented as a logical requirement of disarmament. So, too, is "better Red than dead"; or, as one of Thompson's lieutenants in European Nuclear Disarmament said, "better Finnish than finished." So, too, is the idea of unilateral disarmament.



'THE NUCLEAR BALANCE' BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

Unilateralism is a disgraceful notion, produced by people who think so little of themselves that they believe in nothing except life. Neutralism is an admission of philosophical exhaustion. Staying above the war of ideas is not a spiritual triumph; it is a spiritual collapse. It represents a loss in interest in the principles at stake in political systems. And "better Red than dead" is an insult to those who believe "better dead than Red." It is important to remember that there are such people. There were, after all, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, and Afghanis, and indeed Russians, who died resisting Soviet power because they believed it was the rational thing to do. It will be objected that their resistance to the Russians carried no danger of nuclear catastrophe; but nuclear catastrophe, it cannot be sufficiently stressed, is not the only possible outcome of anti-Communism. "Better Red than dead," in any case, is a very big idea. It takes a lot down with it. It is not only a response to the threat of extinction; it is an attitude toward public life, which affects the moral and psychological preparedness to resist totalitarianism at any time.

These ideas are easily enough refuted; and none of them, in any case, will in any way affect the targeting of Soviet missiles. The destruction of Western Europe's industrial capacity will remain an essential part of the Soviet Union's strategy in any war with the United States. But it is essential that those who are dedicated to peace be made to understand that none of these ideas is in any way properly derived from the fear of nuclear war. They are derived only from the ideological and political preferences of their authors.

Consider the case of Thompson. He joined the Communist Party in 1940 and left it in 1956. He calls himself a "dissident Communist" and the totalitarian societies of the Soviet empire "pseudo-Communist." In an open letter to Leszek Kolakowski in 1973, an angry denunciation of Marxist disillusionment, Thompson wrote that "what we dissident Communists did in Britain—and for this achievement I still feel a stubborn pride—was to refuse to enter the well-worn paths of apostasy.... We had, after all, our experiential political reasons for being opposed to capitalist society, independent of any evolution in Eastern Europe whatsoever." Later he made the same point more colorfully: "For no matter how hideous the alternative may seem, no word of mine will be willingly added to the comforts of that old bitch gone in the teeth, consumer capitalism." Communism, on the other hand, may be a bitch, but it is not yet gone in the teeth. "Fifty years is too short a time to judge a new social system." (This is exactly how Franz Mehring defended the Bolsheviks—"the long wind of history," he called it. He made his defense, however, in 1917.) The revolution in Russia, according to Thompson, was obstructed by "circumstances, contingencies, accidents, events," and "the logic of polarities within a divided world." The last phrase refers to the interference of the United States in the natural development of socialism. ("We must remember that the failure of '1956' was in part a failure imposed by 'the West.' ")

Thompson's ideological biography does not discredit his ideas; they discredit themselves. It does disclose, however, the intellectual predicament in which they

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were developed. This predicament must be understood if the antinuclear argument is to be shaken loose from them. Thompson is most emphatically anti-Soviet and he is most emphatically anti-American. He seeks "a third way." There is an equivalence of evil, he believes, between the superpowers. Thompson is pretty serene, in the passages quoted above, about the satanic statistics of Stalin's reign—fifty years may be too short a time to judge a new social system, but it was ample time to kill eighty million people—and such habits of historical judgment no doubt leave him with a certain theoretical predisposition to find unfreedom in America. They leave him, too, with a willingness to give Soviet foreign policy the benefit of the doubt. "The basic postures of the Soviet Union seem to me, still, to be those of siege and aggressive defense; and even the brutal and botching intervention in Afghanistan appears to have followed upon sensitivity as to United States and Chinese strategies." On the other hand, "the United States seems to me to be more dangerous and provocative in its general military and diplomatic strategies, which press around the Soviet Union with menacing bases." This is the common left-wing theory according to which the Soviet Union is expanding because it is "encircled."

STILL, EVEN THOMPSON admits that the equivalence between the Soviet Union and the United States is rather rough. Speaking of Watergate, which he compares to Khrushchev's "demystificatory" speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, Thompson writes that "the rhetoric of constitutionalism and of personal liberty turned out to be somewhat tougher, more internalized, than one had come to suppose." It is grudging praise, but it is praise. Thus a problem for Thompson remained. The intellectual foundations for the third way were a little shaky. Capitalism may have been no better than Communism, but the United States looked a bit better than the Soviet Union. The discovery of the nuclear danger, however, solved the problem. The doctrine of "exterminism" makes the equivalence between the United States and the Soviet Union exact. Once these political systems are defined essentially by the bomb, they really are equals in evil. It is not the idea of disarmament, then, that requires the idea of neutralism; it is the idea of neutralism that requires the idea of disarmament.

Thompson's version of the antinuclear argument is not his alone. This constellation of ideas, which promotes the criticism of the arms race into a larger historical criticism, is shared by many on the left. (The Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament, an influential document circulated in Western Europe in April 1980, warns that "the powers of the military and of internal security forces are enlarged, limitations are placed between free exchanges of ideas and between persons, and civil rights of independent-minded individuals are threatened, in the West as well as the East"; and it concludes that "we must commence to act as if a united, neutral, and pacific Europe already exists.") What are the merits of such an analysis? Beyond the call to arms control, they are not many. There is a false premise to Thompson's argument, which may be called nuclear reductionism. He is arguing, like Schell, backward from the apocalypse: because everything may be destroyed by the bomb, everything may be explained by it. But it is striking how much of social and political life since 1945 cannot be explained by the bomb. The frequency of war, most notably. Hiroshima was supposed to put an end to war; the stakes, it was commonly said, were now too high. But twenty-five million people have died in war since Hiroshima. The weak, moreover, have frequently defied the strong; the movements of national liberation were never deterred, and the existence of nuclear weapons did not keep smaller states that did not have them from waging war with larger states that did.

THERE ARE MANY political and economic features of the international situation upon which nuclear weapons have no bearing. The same is true about many political and economic features of the states that possess nuclear weapons. The security apparatus of the Soviet Union, for example, was in place long before it built a bomb. The Lubyanka prison, and the philosophy of control that it represents, was already in existence when Soviet physicists went to work. The repression by the Soviet regime of its own people was not generated by its technological ability to do so. Thompson's thesis underestimates the place of such repression in the Soviet scheme of things.

He overestimates its place in the American scheme of things. It is hard to know how to reply to the view that abuses of rights in the United States are like abuses of rights in the Soviet Union. Plainly they differ by many orders of magnitude. Nixon broke into the office of his critic's psychiatrist; Brezhnev committed his critics to a psychiatric hospital. It is extremely dubious, moreover, that abuses of rights in this country are related to its nuclear development. They, too, took place before 1945. What has racism, for example, to do with the Pentagon? It has been suggested, more specifically, that the internal surveillance insanity that overcame the Nixon government was a spillover from the mentality of secrecy that attends all things nuclear. This is rather forced. The persecutions of CONTELPRO originated in a political style and a personality disorder that cannot be laid at the Defense Department's door. CONTELPRO, moreover, was conducted by the same Administration that conducted SALT. And it was ended. A new Administration "leashed" the F.B.I.—and unleashed the MX missile. The fight for civil liberties, in short, scored its greatest successes in the nuclear age. The Bill of Rights was not abrogated by the bomb.

The political culture of the United States cannot be reduced to its military culture. Thompson thinks too crudely about the relationship of internal security to

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

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external security. "Deterrence has repressed the violence towards the opposing bloc," he writes; "the repressed violence has backed up, and worked its way into the economy, the polity, the ideology, and the culture of the opposing blocs." But the state of weaponry is not directly reproduced in the state of society. Can the author of *The Making of the British Working Class* really believe that the social process is so simple? Or the foreign policy process? The state of society is not directly reproduced in the state of foreign policy; free nations may sin against freedom, as Thompson is often the first to proclaim. The introduction of nuclear power raised the stakes of foreign policy—statesmen are now responsible for more than they have ever been—but it did not reduce foreign policy to military strategy.

The present Administration also seems not to know this. Its national security policy is ultimately underwritten by the demented doctrine of nuclear use. Thompson's consternation, therefore, is not without foundation. But he cannot be followed his whole way. His argument against nuclear weapons is an argument against too much. Thompson is like the bewildered girl in Randall Jarrell's novel, who looked under her bed and discovered a horse. He looked under his bed and discovered a missile.

THE ANTINUCLEAR AGITATION has included another attitude that must be challenged. This is the new disreputability of defense. There has grown up in the midst of those who oppose the arms race a great distaste for all things military. Because they hate war, they hate armies. They think that armies are the cause of wars; or, as C. Wright Mills put it, "the immediate cause of World War III is the preparation of it." The scientific establishment that is appended to the military has also come in for a fair share of the popular contempt, despite the fact that it was from among its ranks that the alarm about nuclear arms was first sounded. This antimilitary attitude takes a number of forms. Foremost among them is the opposition to defense spending, both in the United States and in Europe. What began as a campaign against bombs has become a campaign against tanks. The defense budget has been attacked not merely for its details, but also for its principles. Many of its details, to be sure, are dubious, particularly its provisions for the extravagant electronics that are so beloved by American military planners. And it includes among its principles the preparedness to fight and win a protracted nuclear war—a promise of death for millions. There is an absence of conscience in the nuclear budget of this government. But the absence of conscience stops there.

The economic argument against defense spending is of two kinds. The first is made from a vision of American security; it has been advanced most sensibly by James Fallows, an important figure in the liberal reawakening to problems of defense. He has shown that money is being wasted on weapons that are not required, or that will not work. The basis of his criticism is a constructive concern that the United States be efficiently defended; the criterion for military spending, it is agreed, must be military need. The second kind of economic argument is made from a vision of American society. According to this argument the criterion of military spending must be social need. Money spent on weapons, after all, is money not spent on something else; and staggering sums are spent on weapons. Dollars given to the Pentagon are dollars taken away from the poor. There is a more ideological inflection to this argument—the citizens of this country are told to choose between the welfare state and the warfare state. It is also argued, in a similar vein, that the criterion of military spending must be economic need, that capital must be transferred from the military industries to the civilian industries if the decline in American economic power is to be reversed. John Kenneth Galbraith finds a direct correlation between the lower percentage of the gross national product that Germany and Japan devoted to their military in the 1970s and the economic eminence they achieved in those years. (This is a curious explanation of the strength of the Japanese, and no explanation at all of the new German weakness.) Spending for defense distorts the economy, then, or it distorts the society.

It is true that the economic consequences of the military buildup proposed by the Reagan Administration will be dire; but these may be remedied by a change not in the military policy, but in the economic policy. A change in the military policy can be justified only on military grounds. (Lester Thurow has made this point.) It is precisely on such grounds, for example, that the MX missile is not justified. In a time of hardship, it is especially galling that some of these stupendous sums may be kept from Aid to Families with Dependent Children. In such a time, if it is not necessary that a weapon be built, it is necessary that it not be built. But if the MX, or any other equally expensive weapon, can be shown to be essential to the country's security, the money should go to it. The government can tax; and only because it refuses to tax does it seem as if we must choose between Social Security and national security. What's more, the economic argument against defense spending turns against its makers in the case of NATO; a conventional defense of Europe would be much more expensive than a nuclear defense. It was for the sake of frugality ("more bang for the buck") that the Eisenhower Administration first adopted the notorious notion of "massive retaliation" as the basis of American military strategy.

The social argument against defense spending is, in one respect, quite easily disposed of; families with dependent children must be alive if they are to be aided. But the argument raises serious questions about the dispositions of democracies in matters of defense. The philosophical foundations of the welfare state, it is sometimes said, dissuade its population from the military dimensions of foreign policy. As one scholar has

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written, "the modern emphasis on the education, health, and welfare of the common man is in fundamental conflict with foreign policies based on regarding man elsewhere as a legitimate object of aggression and oppression." Of this, certainly, we may be proud; and this philosophical condition accounts in part for the difficulty faced by recent Administrations in winning popular support for double standards in their positions on human rights. But emphasis on "education, health, and welfare" may also lead to an introversion of political interests, to a decreasing preoccupation with foreign affairs. Which would be no danger at all, if political interests in the Soviet Union were of any significance to the men who govern it. The military budget of the Soviet Union, however, requires nobody's approval. Andropov has no need of Boll Weevils.

THE AUTHORS of the Constitution did not have militarism in mind when they put providing for the common defense before promoting the general welfare, and it is not militarism that I wish to defend. I wish only to defend defense. The opposition to spending for conventional weapons has opportunistically borrowed its moral prestige from the opposition to spending for nuclear weapons. The antiwar movement: there is moral prestige already in the name. But the antiwar movement of the 1960s fought a real war. The antiwar movement of the 1980s fights a possible war. It is invariably a good fight, if it is against a possible nuclear war. But many possible wars are not nuclear. The purpose of an antiwar movement in the absence of a real war, then, may be problematic. The problem is not pacifism, which does not exist as a serious political force in the United States. (It does, to a more significant degree, in Europe, where there may be found a phenomenon that might be called the pacifist in the Palestinian headdress, or Sandinistas for SALT—people who prefer the loss of innocent lives in revolution to the loss of innocent lives in war.) The problem is, rather, a much more serious proposition, which is that the use of force is not a legitimate instrument of national policy in the nuclear age.

Jonathan Schell writes that "the ruin of war by nuclear weapons has brought about a divorce between violence and politics." We live "in the pre-nuclear world," he maintains, when we believe that "sovereign nations could still employ the instruments of violence as instruments of policy." A similar conclusion appears in the Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, which was chaired by Olaf Palme of Sweden. The report, entitled *Common Security*, lists among its conditions for such security that "military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes among nations." It explains: "Historically, the use of force as an instrument of national policy has only rarely been effective in the long run.[!] In the nuclear age, it raises risks which are disproportionate to any conceivable gain." The injunction, please note, includes all forms of force, not merely nuclear war. The report goes on to say that "prevailing definitions on self-defense must be tightened and narrowed," so as to rob war of its most acceptable justification. On this last point, however, the Palme Commission is admirably ambivalent. "Nevertheless, all states must retain the right to use force in their own defense and, in accord with the conditions and procedures specified in the Charter of the United Nations, in collective defense of victims of aggression." Which brings war's justification back.

The delegitimization of war in the nuclear age is not completely without reason. The reason is the fear of escalation. The threshold between conventional war and nuclear war is more easily crossed than the threshold between war and peace; and so the surest way to avoid nuclear conflict is to avoid all conflict. Unfortunately not all the peace movement's objections to war are so responsible. There lurks within it the conviction, formulated most vocally by the churches, that after the invention of nuclear weapons there can no longer be a just war. The truth is that the notion of the just war was discredited for many of the marchers not so much by Hiroshima as by Vietnam, particularly by the filthy way the war was fought. And so the argument is heard, as it was in Europe even as Hitler's troops were barreling across the borders, that to defeat the enemy you must become like the enemy. The enemy, therefore, is not Russia, or Germany—the enemy is war. There is a sense, of course, in which this is true. There are no clean wars; and the consequences of only a conventional war would be ruinous enough. There are, however, just wars.

WRITING OF THE MOTIVES for the arms race, Galbraith observes that the most influential motive of all is "the belief, strong in the United States, much cited in oratory, that we are defending an economic, social, and political system." Galbraith's irony is ill judged. We *are* defending such a system. We may be defending it poorly, and there may be those who are battening unfairly upon its defense. But there will be a high price to pay in the moral condition of the country if the attack upon the military and industrial particulars of the United States becomes an attack upon its purposes. There is a moral basis to the idea of security. It is in this matter of the relation of moral principle to military power that the influence of Vietnam has been most baleful; and it is in this matter, too, that the peace movement of the 1980s is most sadly the heir of the peace movement of the 1960s. Those for whom Vietnam was the primal political scene have difficulty in discerning the relation of principle to power. Those for whom World War II was the primal political scene do not. They know that there may come a time when there is no higher expression of the values by which we live than the fight for them. The hatred of all things military is finally a sign that you do not believe in what you are, that you do not believe that you have something to lose.

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This may be the state of a growing number of young Europeans, to judge by recent public opinion polls; a poll taken in Germany last year, for example, showed 56 percent of the 16- to 20-year-olds surveyed preferring Soviet domination to war, and only 25 percent agreeing that democracy is worth defending.

Of course, there can never be a nuclear war that is just. There is no moral standard that can sanction it. The remnants of the civilization that caused such a catastrophe would have no right to the values it had created; the values for which whole populations lived would die when whole populations died. Michael Walzer has precisely analyzed the moral illegitimacy of nuclear war. "It would violate both of the proportionality limits fixed by the theory of war: the number of people killed in the war as a whole would not be warranted by the goals of the war—particularly since the dead would include many if not most of the people for whose defense the war was being fought; and the number of killed in individual actions would be disproportionate . . . to the value of the targets directly attacked." All this comes, however, at the end of a scrupulous defense of the notion of the just war. There have been wars that had to be fought.

TO BE ANTINUCLEAR, then, is not to be antimilitary. Nor is it to be anti-American. Nuclear weapons have introduced a new circumspection into the conduct of international affairs, but the circumspection must not go so far as to deny our assistance to those whose freedoms have been confiscated by Communism (or, for that matter, by Fascism). Unfortunately the fear of nuclear weapons is having just that effect. It has become the new argument for neutralism—the argument that silences all criticism. It has also become the new argument for isolationism. The nuclear danger is invoked to inhibit not only military interventions, but political and economic interventions as well. The response of some liberal intellectuals to the recent repression in Poland offers a good example. A prominent liberal commentator who is no admirer of the Soviet Union argued in this journal that the United States must blunt its reaction to the smashing of Solidarity because "a sudden collapse" of Russia's empire in Eastern Europe "could be dangerous if it triggers a violent Soviet reaction. We do, after all, live in an age of nuclear weapons." It is extremely unlikely, however, that the Soviets would have responded to a default on the Polish debt by firing an SS-20. A few German banks would probably have collapsed, that is all; and the Soviets would have been properly punished by political means only. This liberal's analysis is a perfect illustration of the way in which the fear of nuclear war becomes an excuse for any projection of Soviet power.

But then there is the White House, and the Department of Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, where the fear of the Soviet Union is an excuse for any projection of nuclear power.

II.

THE PARTY OF WAR

LIKE THE ANTINUCLEARISTS IN THE PEACE movement, the nuclearists in power defend their position with a view of the world and a view of the weapons. The official nuclear strategy of the United States, which has been slowly evolving in a sinister direction since the Schlesinger stewardship of the Pentagon, is based upon two sets of conclusions, both of them highly contestable. The first concerns the nuclear strategy, and more generally the political intentions, of the Soviet Union, which, according to Richard Pipes, "thinks it can fight and win a nuclear war"; the second concerns the nuclear arsenal's reason for being, which, according to the present Pentagon, is to be used. It now looks as if the United States thinks it can fight and win a nuclear war, too.

It is not true, as some "hawks" have maintained, that the concept of deterrence does not appear in Soviet military thinking; it does, most prominently in the basic treatise of Soviet military doctrine edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, where it is stated that "the greater the buildup of means of mass destruction, the greater the conviction in the impossibility of their use." The text speaks also of "balance" and "parity" and "stalemate," as do other Soviet sources. Still, there does exist a great divergence in nuclear doctrine between the United States and the Soviet Union. That is indisputable. To judge by many of the texts of its military planners that have reached the West, often against the wishes of the Kremlin, the Soviet Union thinks about nuclear war less gingerly than does the United States. Deterrence does not seem to have been the controlling concept of Soviet strategic thinking. The point of departure for Soviet military writers on nuclear war is not Brodie's dictum on deterrence, cited above; they depart, rather, from the dictum of Clausewitz, enthusiastically endorsed by Lenin, that war is a continuation of politics by other means. In the words of one Soviet general,

> this does not mean that nuclear war . . . has ceased to be an instrument of politics, as is claimed by the overwhelming majority of representatives of pacifist, anti-war movements in the bourgeois world. This is a subjective judgement. It merely expresses protest against nuclear war.

And he continues:

> There is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war. The peoples of the world will put an end to imperialism, which is causing mankind incalculable suffering.

There are many more such passages in the organs of the Soviet military establishment. They seem strange, and they are. The strangeness of the Soviet military mentality, however, is no reason for it not to be taken

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seriously. Liberals have a hard time taking strangeness seriously; and there has existed in the liberal community the belief that the Soviet Union will catch up to the United States in strategy as in science, that there will be a convergence in the nuclear doctrines of the superpowers as the Russians come to share the American faith in the rationality of deterrence. This has not happened. The Soviet Union has its own ideas and idioms in nuclear matters. Its approach to nuclear war has not quite broken with the traditional approach to war.

Many reasons for this have been given. It is said, for example, that the difference between its approach and ours is the difference between the military mind and the civilian mind. There does not exist in the Soviet Union the phenomenon of civilians making military policy. Membership in the military, however, has not prevented many American generals from adopting the doctrine of deterrence, and the Soviet defense minister is a civilian. Historical and cultural reasons have also been adduced, from the role of the army in the development of Russia (Professor Pipes feels that the Russian subjugation of Kazan and Astrakhan in the sixteenth century has some bearing upon the Kremlin's plans for its ICBMs) to the infatuation of Marx and Lenin with Clausewitz and Darwin. It has even been suggested that the loss of twenty million people in the Second World War makes it much less difficult for the Soviet leadership to contemplate suffering such losses in the Third. Whatever the reason, when it comes to considering the consequences of nuclear war, the Soviets seem less spooked.

THE MORNING AFTER' BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

The principal tenets of Soviet nuclear doctrine, as they have been established by scholars, are these: that a nuclear war-fighting capacity must be maintained, because the security of the Soviet Union must be based not upon the good sense of the enemy not to attack, but upon the ability of Soviet forces to withstand an attack; that victory is possible in a nuclear war; that the advantage in a nuclear war will accrue to whichever side strikes first; that "the creation and constant maintenance of qualitative and quantitative superiority over the enemy in this means of armed conflict" is essential; and that there are effective forms of civil defense against nuclear weapons, and practical programs for survival. "Soviet strategic doctrine," in the words of Benjamin Lambeth, the author of a RAND study of the subject, "is manifestly a combat-oriented operational philosophy that treats the possibility of nuclear war as a threat that cannot simply be wished away."

There are elements of official Soviet thinking about nuclear war that are fantastic. These may be found in connection with its objective of "total victory." After a strategic nuclear exchange, the Soviets have plans for the burning cities of America. "Combat operations will continue for the purpose of the final defeat of the enemy on his own territory" because "that side which manages during the first days of the war to penetrate more deeply into enemy territory naturally acquires the capability for more effectively using the results of its nuclear attacks and disrupting the mobilization of the enemy." The territory will be occupied; its population will be politically controlled and ideologically converted. "As for ideological struggle, in conditions of nuclear war . . . it will be conducted through all possible channels and in the most active forms. The war itself is a competition of the spirit, ideas, world outlook, ideologies, and moral stability of the personnel of the armed forces and the population of the country." Marxism, in short, will rule the ruins.

Soviet doctrine is reproduced in Soviet development. The Brezhnev era began with a historic rapprochement between the Party and the military. The immediate cause of the happy new relationship was Khrushchev's humiliation in Cuba, which would not have happened, it was said, if the Soviet Union had been better armed. But there was a deeper cause, which is that the government and the army came to have common purposes. The government relied more upon the army for its authority; militarism is inevitable in a political system without legitimacy. The Soviet Union, as Cornelius Castoriadis has brilliantly described it, has been slowly militarized.

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This means not only that generals are now prominent in the making of foreign and domestic policy, but also that the economy and the society of the Soviet Union have been sedulously reorganized according to the needs of its military forces and industries. It is now commonly acknowledged that Brezhnev presided over the most dramatic military buildup in Soviet history. The Soviet Union is more or less equal to the United States in its nuclear capacity, and superior to the United States (if not to the West as a whole) in its conventional capacity. The militarization of the Soviet Union is certainly the most disturbing development in many decades. It has transformed a state founded upon a dream of world domination into a military power of monstrous proportions. And so the "hawks" cry havoc.

THERE IS A DANGER, obviously. The "hawks" have been more correct about the Russians than the "doves." But they have not been completely correct, particularly in their conclusions concerning Soviet nuclear policy. Consider, for example, the Soviet belief in "striking first," which they have amply documented. This is simply not the same as a belief in "a first strike." The Soviet doctrine of "preemption," as it is called, means only that the Soviet Union would fire its missiles first if a crisis with the United States reached the point at which a nuclear exchange seemed inevitable. But this is tactics, not strategy. "Preemptive" war is not "preventive" war. It is, quite the contrary, similar to what is known in the West as "launch on warning"; and it is identical to a consideration put forward by a member of the Carter Administration when he wrote that "resorting to intercontinental nuclear attack would likely be the result of a conviction that a nuclear exchange had become inevitable, and that some advantage would obtain from going first." This is a provision for the brink of war, not for the breaking of the peace. There is no evidence at all that the Soviets believe in "first strike," or that they have plans to start a nuclear war, or that their nuclear strategy is, as Pipes put it, "not retaliation but offensive action." (Many of the Soviet scenarios for fighting a nuclear war include the saving subordinate clause "if it is unleashed by the imperialists.") If the Soviets believe in "first strike," why have they not struck? After all, the United States, according to the "hawks," has never been weaker. The Soviets know as well as Pipes what their strength is. Perhaps they know better than he what our strength is.

Soviet doctrine, moreover, is not all that determines Soviet behavior. Despite the chilling certitudes of Soviet planning for nuclear war, it is impossible—for us as well as for them—to be sure that the plans describe how the planners would conduct themselves in a crisis. No one knows exactly how a nuclear war will be fought; this uncertainty unnerves all who even perfunctorily study the problem, and it must be reckoned alongside the Soviet swagger. The state of Soviet forces, too, must be reckoned. They are formidable, to be sure; but they are not maintained in a state of preparedness that implies an intention to act. The deployment of Soviet nuclear forces in peacetime is not in keeping with Soviet nuclear doctrine. Soviet bombers are on the ground more than American bombers, and Soviet submarines are in port more than American submarines, and Soviet nuclear forces are less frequently "on alert" than their American counterparts. There is evidence, furthermore, that nuclear weapons in the forward area of the Warsaw Pact are not collocated to their delivery systems, and that responsibility for these weapons in peacetime falls not to the military command but to the K.G.B.

Some of the Soviet Union's nuclear notions are alarming, yes; but they are also absurd. What does it matter if they are making plans for after the apocalypse? The fantasies of seizing smoldering radio stations are fearful, but they are of no consequence. Nor is the fantasy of civilian defense. Shelters will not work wherever they are. They will save no one from a direct hit, or from the fallout of a direct hit, in Moscow or in Manhattan.

THE MOST SEDUCTIVE of the Soviet Union's nuclear fictions is probably the notion of nuclear superiority. It is a notion to which the American government seems to subscribe—for example, in the Report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress for the fiscal year 1983, where it states that although our "modernization program is not designed to achieve nuclear 'superiority' for the United States, by the same token, we will make every necessary effort to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring such superiority and to insure the margin of safety necessary for our security." There is an unsettling confusion here, perfectly expressed by those quotation marks—we do not want " 'superiority,' " but we won't let them have "superiority." Here it is meaningless and there it is meaningful. Whatever the Administration's view of the notion of nuclear superiority, it clearly subscribes to the notion of nuclear inferiority. The President warns that the land-based Minuteman missiles of the United States, all 1,052 of them, are "a window of vulnerability" in the American deterrent, and he is right. Why have the Soviets not taken them out, however, if they can do so with such ease? The answer, of course, is that they cannot take them out with any ease at all. They would have to destroy most of our missiles to avoid the retaliatory power of those that remained. The United States, moreover, will hardly wait to see if a Soviet strike is a success. Missiles fired from American submarines would find their targets behind the Urals before missiles fired from Soviet bases would find their targets behind the Rockies. Our nuclear force at sea is impossible to detect, and impossible to defend against. (It is worth noting that responsible opponents of the arms race such as Hans Bethe support the improvement of the American marine deterrent, particularly of the Trident II missiles—which a freeze would not allow.) To be sure, the vulnerability of our land-based missiles is a real problem, but it may have no solution. Such missiles may be

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
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in a state of strategic senescence. This should worry the Soviets more, however; three-quarters of their nuclear force consists of ICBMs. We think that we are vulnerable through a window, but they know that they are vulnerable through the front door.

Still, we are not in a position of superiority, because there is no such thing. Our submarines ensure only that our adversary, too, will not survive. The notion of nuclear superiority is without meaning, because the losses on either side will be too much to bear if only a single missile gets through, and more than a single missile will. There is a sense in which "Soviet" strategy is like "Soviet" genetics. The United States would be as foolish to believe that the numbers any longer matter, or that a nuclear war can be won, as it would be to believe that winter wheat will grow in the spring. The strategy is determined by the weapon. The missiles have only to exist, and deterrence is the law of their existence. For this reason the Soviet Union acts in accordance with the doctrine of deterrence even if it does not think in accordance with it. Deterrence may go with the American grain or against the Russian grain; it may suit the philosophical and cultural bias of a nation that knows little about war and wants to dwell apart, or it may not suit the philosophical and cultural bias of a nation that knows a great deal about war and wants the world; but it suits the weapons. That is why many of the doctrinal differences between the United States and the Soviet Union do not matter. *Any* strategy that respects the lethality and the invulnerability of these arms will deter a war between the great powers that possess them. As Brodie wrote, "their being there is quite enough."

THE NUCLEARISTS in and out of government cannot justify their position, then, with reference to Soviet strategy, even if Soviet strategy is in many ways deeply disturbing. But these people are not exactly disturbed by it. The "hawks" do not attack Soviet strategy; they admire it. That is their dirty little secret. They accept a great deal of the Soviet approach to nuclear weapons. There is indeed a convergence in doctrine taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union. But they are not coming around to our way of thinking; we are coming around to theirs. Something terrible is happening in the defense community of the United States, and it is the Sovietization of American strategy. A balance of terror is now threatened by a balance of error. When both sides believe these things, there may be trouble.

The Sovietization of American strategy began well before Reagan came to office. It was conceived, without irony, for the sake of deterrence. The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Planning in the Carter Administration, for example, expressed this lucidly: "Our policies must take account of what we know of Soviet perspectives on these issues. For by definition, deterrence requires shaping Soviet assessments about the risks of war, assessments that will be made using their models, even if we think those models less accurate than our own." There is some sense in this; deterrence is, after all, a communication of intent, and the communication must be made in a language that will be understood. But it did not stop there. The Carter Administration came to bless and stayed to curse. In 1977 and 1978 it requested large allocations from Congress for the purpose of civil defense; the debate about that dubious idea was immediately renewed, and Congress awarded the President less than he asked. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger had converted American strategy to "counterforce," to the targeting of military sites instead of civilian sites, for the purpose of providing the United States with more options in the waging of a nuclear war. His successor, Harold Brown, perpetrated Presidential Directive 59; this, in the words of one commentator, "aimed to improve deterrence by improving the capacity for a prolonged but limited nuclear war." The muddle in such thinking is macabre. The Administration that began with ideas of minimum nuclear deterrence ended with ideas of limited nuclear war. It is always in the name of deterrence that deterrence is undone. It must be made "flexible," it was said, as it was said in the 1950s, and again in the 1960s—flexible enough, that is, to include a fight. Such refinements in American strategy have led Theodore Draper to observe dourly that deterrence "may yet equal liberty for the number of crimes committed in its name."

Draper made his observation about the Reagan Administration, and quite rightly. What Carter started Reagan finished. The Sovietization of American strategy has been perfected in the Weinberger Pentagon. "The assessments that truly matter," an adviser to the Administration has written, "are those made in Moscow." On May 30 Richard Halloran of *The New York Times* published the outlines of a classified document described as "the first complete defense guidance of this administration." The document defines a five-year plan for defense that might indeed have been made in Moscow. It is a strategy for fighting a nuclear war "over a protracted period." American nuclear forces in such a conflict, it declares, "must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination on terms favorable to the United States." How is this to be accomplished? "Decapitation," that is how; the objective of the United States in a nuclear war is "to render ineffective the total Soviet (and Soviet-allied) military and political structure," which includes the destruction of communications lines within the Soviet Union. (This repeats Carter's hope of finding Soviet leaders in their bunkers, of depriving the enemy of "its own ability to maintain control after a war starts.")

Nor is this all. The Defense Guidance provides for the development of ballistic missile defense systems; and it is bold to suggest that the United States might revise the A.B.M. treaty—one of the very few achievements of arms control negotiations, and a monument to the doctrine of deterrence—if a new generation of ICBMs re-

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quires such a revision. Defense against nuclear weapons appears to rank high in the present Administration's priorities. The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Nuclear Forces told a reporter last January that a proper civil defense program would enable the United States to recover fully from an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union in only two to four years; and according to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which would carry out the plans for civil defense, "the United States could survive a nuclear attack and then go on to recovery within a relatively few years."

'PROTRACTED,' "prevail," "survive"—this is the semantics of suicide. It is important to make clear what these words mean in the real world. "Protracted" means that hostilities will not end with the end of Washington and Moscow, or New York and Leningrad. Many missiles will fly many times. The fight for the rubble over there will continue from the rubble over here. After all, if all goes according to plan, we will not have been "decapitated"; they will have been. But how do you end a war with an enemy whose head you have cut off? What is the sense in destroying the people with whom we may negotiate? Negotiations, however, are not the object of the war; the object of the war, rather, is to "prevail."

The idea of "prevailing" in a nuclear war looks a lot like the idea of winning a nuclear war. Secretary Weinberger insists that this is not so. He declares his belief that nuclear wars cannot be won, but then he goes on to say that "we certainly are planning not to be defeated." A senior White House adviser, in a speech on national security approved by President Reagan in June, announced that "prevailing with pride is the principal new ingredient of American security policy." Never mind that after a nuclear war all we will have left to be proud of is the performance of our missiles. If we are to prevail, let us at least prevail with shame. We will, anyway, prevail posthumously. But what exactly does "prevailing" mean? Presumably it has something to do with the "termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States." But what can such terms be? What remnant of the Soviet Union will the United States make its demands of? And what remnant of the United States will be making the demands? Perhaps we will want to occupy their territory. Then we can put out their fires. Perhaps we will want to control their population. Then we can dig their graves.

There is another assumption in all this tough talk about "prevailing" in a "protracted" nuclear war, which is that the people upon whom the missiles have fallen will still see some reason for the war. The Defense Guidance is under the impression that the individuals who are not incinerated will continue to carry the flag. This is asking a lot. The principles for which the war was started will not command very much allegiance a few strategic exchanges later; nor should they. The survivors of the kind of war contemplated by the patriots at the Pentagon probably will hate everything this country ever stood for. Will their leaders, when they surface from their safe holes in the ground, remind them that Russia was worse? Patriotism will also die by radiation. Brodie made the point well. "Whether the survivors be many or few," he wrote in 1957, "in the midst of a land scarred and ruined beyond all present comprehension, they should not be expected to show much concern for the further pursuit of political-military objectives." That the Communists lost the war will be no consolation. The survivors will look around and see that they did, too.

Of all the Administration's circumlocutions, however, "survival" is the most contemptible, because it means exactly its opposite. These critics of the peace movement angrily deny that a nuclear war will mean the end of humanity; this, they say, is hysteria. They are right. Somebody will almost certainly have the bad luck to live on. Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island asked Eugene Rostow the critical question at his confirmation hearings: "In the event of nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States, do you envision either country surviving?" Rostow, who was confirmed as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, replied: "The human race is very resilient, Senator Pell." The man takes the long view. He regards ground zero under the aspect of eternity. Rostow went on to explain that there would be "10 million dead on one side and 100 million on the other, but that is not the whole population." The 10 million dead are American, presumably, and the 100 million are Russian—we win again. This actuarial attitude toward suffering on such a scale is astonishing. Rostow's figures, moreover, are false. The demographic distributions of the United States and the Soviet Union make it likely that millions more would die here and millions less would die there. But it is not only the figures that are so frightening. It is the sentiment. It brings to mind another thinker about the future, Edward Teller, who is advising the Administration; he has assured his countrymen just as philosophically that "the biggest nuclear conflict would be a catastrophe beyond imagination. But it will not be the end." Teller, of course, believes that we can save humanity from the worst if only we build shelters, but there is no evidence that Rostow believes in shelters. He believes in acceptable losses. Just as the Soviets do, in fact. "Survival," then, is just another version of the long wind of history. It is a euphemism for extermination.

THIS IS WHAT they have done to deterrence. They have not abandoned it, to be sure, but they have diluted it. The idea of mutual assured destruction, upon which deterrence is based, competes in our defense planning with the idea of counterforce, upon which nuclear use is based; and it is losing the competition. There is a confusion of concepts in current American strategy. This confusion appeared nakedly in a speech given by Secretary of State Alexander Haig in April. "Deterrence depends," he said, "upon our capability,

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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even after suffering a massive nuclear blow, to prevent an aggressor from securing a military advantage and prevailing in a conflict. Only if we maintain such a capability can we deter such a blow." Now this is precisely what deterrence is not. After receiving "a massive nuclear blow," that is, a first strike, all that remains is to return "a massive nuclear blow," that is, a second strike; it is the certainty of the second strike that keeps the peace by promising the side that strikes first the same fate as the side that was first struck. Two strikes, in any case, and both sides will be out. This is the structure of deterrence. It is not the structure of what Haig was proposing. The war he imagined will not end with the devastation of the dreaded first and second strikes. He imagined, quite the contrary, an extended series of devastations—the two nations on their knees, punc g wildly, redundantly sending missiles into far-away seas of fire. And yet the Secretary thought that he was describing deterrence.

In fairness to the Reagan Administration, it must be said that its dilution of deterrence is not new. And in fairness to the Carter Administration, it must be said that Secretary of Defense Brown was right when he insisted that Presidential Directive 59 was not "a radical departure" from doctrines developed by his recent predecessors. It has been shown, in fact, that American plans for fighting a nuclear war already existed in the mid-1950s. But they were evil then and they are evil now. Consider, for example, the sequence of strikes contemplated by our current strategy. They begin by "rendering ineffective" the Soviet "military and political power structure"; they move from this hardest of "hard" targets to "nuclear and conventional military forces and industry critical to military power"; and from these still pretty "hard" targets to Soviet industry. Nowhere in the Defense Guidance is there any mention of "soft" targets—that is, of strikes against civilians. The strategy seems clean—all counterforce and no countervalue. The authors of the Defense Guidance may even be congratulating themselves on the morality of a strategy that does not target cities. But where is Soviet industry, and Soviet communications, and Soviet centers of political and military control, if not in Soviet cities? You cannot destroy the Kremlin without destroying the life around it. There are no surgical strikes in a nuclear war.

AT LEAST NOT YET. The Pentagon is now pushing a new kind of nuclear weapon whose objective is precisely a surgical strike. Known as "the third generation," such a weapon would destroy its target without any side effects. The elimination of the side effects known as "collateral damage" from military calculations would make nuclear weapons finally usable. "The third generation" is really a nuclear bullet. There has never been a weapon more precise and less damaging to anything but its target than a bullet. The intercontinental nuclear bullet would seem to transform the present situation by removing the danger. It would seem to return nuclear warfare to a sort of technologically magnificent conventional warfare, and makes strategic weapons behave tactically. But it is not as it seems. The "dirty" weapons are not about to be retired. In fact, nothing will make the use of the "dirty" ones more likely than the use of the "clean" ones. The more precise and less damaging strikes will be made first, which means that a war will have started, which feels like a conventional war but is a nuclear war. The less precise and more damaging strikes will probably follow. The technology the Pentagon is developing is deceptively undangerous, because it will only lull us into an illusion of security. In a nuclear world the only thing more dangerous than nonusable weapons are usable weapons. There is no return to innocence. "The third generation" promises the final perfection of counterforce, but counterforce offers no protection against catastrophe.

As things now stand, none of our weapons are "clean." Counterforce was conceived as a consequence of improvements in the accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which made it possible to hit small targets very far away, but the accuracy of missiles does not yet limit the damage they cause. A more direct hit is still as costly as a less direct hit. In this sense the counterforce strategy of the present Pentagon is what counterforce strategy has always been—sheer sophistry. The concern of counterforce for innocent lives is purely cosmetic. Innocent lives will surely be lost; and the lie that they will not, which flourishes in the strategic formulas of the Soviet Union and the United States, only makes the loss of these lives more likely.

THE SOVIETIZATION of American strategy that is reflected in the Defense Guidance is of a piece with the recent revival of a certain school of thought among defense intellectuals. The man whose work most perfidiously represents this school of thought is Colin Gray, an analyst at the National Institute for Policy in McLean, Virginia. "For the U.S. government to endorse a full-fledged war-fighting doctrine in the strategic realm," Gray writes, "would constitute a doctrinal revolution." This is the revolution that Gray is helping to bring about. "It is unlikely that the United States will be able to overcome its fundamental skepticism over the wisdom of approaching a central nuclear as one should approach . . . non-nuclear war." Presidential Directive 59, he complained, was "flawed but useful." The conceptions of counterforce elaborated since Schlesinger do not satisfy Gray; they are only small steps in the right direction. They provide "a richer menu of attack options," but they do not provide the full strategic feast in which these options make sense—"a theory of victory in war (or satisfactory war termination)." Gray's contribution to strategic studies consists in the elaboration of such a theory. "The Marines raising the flag on Mt. Suribachi is the way in which the President should think of wars being terminated," he writes rousingly. In the same vein, he observes that "the same Department of Defense policy-making hierarchy

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that could not (or would not) design a theory of victory for Vietnam, similarly abandoned such an apparently extravagant notion in the realm of strategic nuclear policy." It is not enough that the Soviet Union be deterred, Gray maintains; it must be defeated. For "first and foremost the Soviet leadership fears *defeat*, not the suffering of damage—and *defeat* . . . has to entail the forcible demise of the Soviet state."

This last observation holds the key to the kind of thinking that was eventually embodied in the Pentagon's present plans. The victory that Gray seeks is not military, but political. What would such a victory be? Most generally, "the destruction of Soviet political authority and the emergence of a post-war world order compatible with Western values." Specifically, the strategy calls for a situation in which "the brain of the Soviet system [is] destroyed or degraded."

> Striking the U.S.S.R. should entail targeting the relocation bunkers of the top political and bureaucratic leadership, including those of the K.G.B.; key communications centers of the Communist party, the military, and the government; and many of the economic, political, and military records. . . . The U.S.S.R., with its gross overcentralization of authority, epitomized by its vast bureaucracy in Moscow, should be highly vulnerable . . . to such an attack. The Soviet Union might cease to function if its security agency, the K.G.B., were severely crippled. If the Moscow bureaucracy could be eliminated, damaged, or isolated, the U.S.S.R. might disintegrate into anarchy. . . ."

These are the intellectual origins of the doctrine of decapitation. Decapitation, however, is not all. Once the file cabinets in Red Square have been taken out by an intercontinental ballistic missile, "disaffected Warsaw Pact allies and ethnic groups inside the Soviet Union . . . can assert their own values in very active political ways." In sum, the Soviet system will be "encouraged to dissolve itself."

THIS IS ANTI-COMMUNISM at its craziest. It is also not at all counterforce. Counterforce would be required for a military victory. The political victory about which Gray hallucinates, however, requires something more—countervalue, the targeting not of silos but of cities. This is exactly what he provides. His "counter-political" objective calls for countervalue of an especially cynical kind. Gray denounces the doctrine of mutual assured destruction for being "immoral," because it directs American missiles at Soviet civilians. Mutual assured destruction, he argues in anger, promises only to punish; "a mass murder theory," he calls it. But where does he direct the missiles? And what does he promise? It makes no difference, from the standpoint of morality, if Moscow is destroyed as punishment for a first strike that destroyed Washington, as deterrence has it; or if it is destroyed in the name of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as Gray has it. One thing is certain: the war he contemplates will kill the people it is designed to free. Gray is dishonest, therefore, when he pretends that he wishes only "to wage war against the Soviet state as opposed to Soviet society"; the distinction does not exist, because there is no nuclear way to crush the Soviet state without crushing Soviet society. The centers of control that Gray lists are civilian centers. For this reason, too, the distinction between "defeating" the Soviets and "damaging" the Soviets is nonsense. The damage that the Soviets would suffer would be the same as defeat. It would be genocide.

THE NOTION OF VICTORY is not the only nuclear fiction that Gray has in common with the Russians. He believes also that "the concept of strategic superiority should be revived," as should "a serious civil defense program." This last item is part of Gray's brave new view of nuclear defenses in general. Last year he argued that "there is a strong case for reassessing every aspect of Ballistic Missile Defense." Noting that there exist technologies for such defense that did not exist when the treaty forbidding it was written, Gray calls for "a new debate." He distinguishes between the defense of military forces ("hard-point defense") and the defense of society ("urban-industrial defense"), and comes out for both. His preferred form of military defense is the Army system known as LOADS (Low Altitude Defense System), which consists of a small, hardened radar and guided interceptor missiles. This will effectively protect the Minuteman missiles, he suggests, though it is "ideally suited" to the MX. (It is implied, of course, that this makes the MX attractive; but it must be first established that missile defense is attractive.) LOADS, in any event, will protect little else. The low altitude of its engagement with incoming missiles makes it too dangerous to use for the sake of air bases, for example, or any military force that is deployed in or near a city. This is not really a sticking point for Gray, however, who writes even about the defense of society that "it is not true that an imperfect city defense is valueless." " 'Leakage' " [now there is nuclear language at its best] "can be controlled by deploying more interceptor missiles." But Gray is no fool. He is not in favor of "urban-industrial defense" because he knows that it will work. Quite the contrary. "No matter how proficient the ballistic missile defenses may be," he writes quite candidly, "there can be no guarantee that a few warheads could not penetrate. No defense system should be expected to 'work' with absolute and total success." The catastrophe, in other words, will come to pass. What, then? Gray has an answer—civil defense, or what he calls "a measure of 'hardening' for urban-industrial America." And if this does not work "with absolute and total success?" He has another answer—"an acceptable failure rate."

What is America's "acceptable failure rate"? Gray names a number: "An intelligent U.S. offensive strategy wedded to homeland defenses" he concludes, "could reduce U.S. casualties to approximately 20 million." Which makes Gray exactly twice as realistic as Rostow, but that is damning with very faint praise. Like the 10-

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

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

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million man, the 20-million man has won the attention of this Administration. Recently the Defense Department asked Gray's advice concerning the basing of the MX. He is a member of the General Advisory Committee, a group of experts regularly consulted by the Pentagon. (A dense pack that works.) And according to members of the Senate staff, Gray had a hand in the drafting of the Defense Guidance. The influence of his ideas upon that document are obvious. The policymakers at the Pentagon swear their devotion to the doctrine of deterrence, but they seek the counsel of deterrence's critics, and they heed it.

THE CRITICISM OF DETERRENCE that has been rehabilitated in official circles is based upon a rather simple consideration—that deterrence, strictly speaking, is not a strategy. This is correct. Deterrence teaches nothing about the manner in which nuclear weapons may be employed. It is, rather, a device to make their employment unnecessary. In this sense it is the very opposite of strategy. It provides only for before the war. What happens, however, when deterrence fails?

It has been remarked that the principal difference in doctrine between the United States and the Soviet Union is that we focus on the prevention of war and they focus on the manner in which the war that was not prevented will be fought; we plan mainly for pre-war deterrence, and they for post-deterrence war. Obviously both must be planned for. There was never a weapon that was not used. It would be morally and politically reckless not to entertain the eventuality that deterrence might fail, that the United States might have to use its nuclear weapons. As Gray puts it, "a central nuclear war really could occur;" for this reason, he concludes, "there is a role for strategy."

But for what strategy? Not any strategy, surely. Operational thinking about nuclear weapons is not in itself odious, as the peace movement often claims; but there are kinds of operational thinking about nuclear weapons that are odious. For example, the kind that orders a nuclear war to be fought until it is won. A need for strategy is not the same as a need for victory. It is a question of war aims. Gray and his ilk simply assume that the traditional aims of war are still good, and pledge allegiance. But there must be a different aim in a nuclear war. The aim in a nuclear war must be to end it, and end it fast. Brodie—the intellectual hero of the nuclear age—observed that "the main war goal upon the beginning of a strategic exchange should surely be to terminate it as quickly as possible and with the least amount of damage possible—on both sides." This is the only sane solution to a mad war. Such sanity, however, has met with scorn by the "hawks" hovering over Washington. Gray, for example, dismissed Brodie's remark by saying that "the best prospect of all for minimizing (prompt) damage lies in surrendering preemptively," which is demagoguery. Pipes attacked "the philosophical premises underlying the mutual-deterrence doctrine" on the grounds that they "ran contrary to all the tenets of traditional military theory, which had always . . . viewed the objective of war to be victory." Pipes prefers the old-fashioned way, like the Russians.

Such views are simply not relevant to reality. They do not face up to the firepower of these weapons. If they did, they could never conceive of them as rational instruments of American interests. There does not exist a doctrine of damage-limitation that our present weapons will not disobey. Deterrence, moreover, was never as dumb as its critics contend. It has always meant more than keeping our fingers crossed. There has been a finger on the trigger, too. American planning has hoped for the best; but, as the distinguished career of counterforce in our military thinking shows, it has also considered the worst. It has not, however, made the worst the norm. That is the intellectual style of the nuclear war fighters. They do not merely provide for pessimism; they turn it into policy. These worst-casers may fulfill their own fears. Under cover of post-deterrence planning they are creating the military and psychological conditions for the greatest tragedy in history.

THE OBJECTION to relying upon the good will of the enemy is well taken. Such a degree of dependence is a shaky basis for security. Sooner or later deterrence may fail; our luck cannot last forever. Measures must be taken, therefore, to cut our losses, and theirs. But these measures must not consist in proposals to prosecute a nuclear war more prettily. They must consist, rather, in the preparation of protocols for the termination of hostilities. Brodie's observation has tremendous implications for nuclear diplomacy. Post-deterrence planning should involve the manufacture of mutually agreed-upon mechanisms for bringing a wicked war quickly to an end. The superpowers must agree on rules for the immediate renunciation of any further use of nuclear weapons after the war has begun. They must throw their prodigious technical prowess into the creation of lines of communication that will survive strategic nuclear exchanges. They may develop diplomatic drills for such a purpose. For once the missiles have started to fly, everything will depend on the mental reflexes of the men who give the orders. They must be able to rely upon habits of mind that dissuade them from pressing on.

But these are not the habits of mind in which they are being trained. They are imbued with ideas and inclinations that say, be soldiers. There will be no soldiers, however, in a strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. There will be only the projectiles and the people. And it will profit nothing to counsel courage, as the "prevailers with pride" do. You cannot be brave against a missile. The best you can do is not fire another one. But this is not how our defenders think. They want to win the war they want to deter. They may have a lot to answer for; if deterrence collapses, it may be in part because it was corrupted.

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III.

The Case Of Europe

THE DEGRADATION OF WESTERN STRATEGY by the doctrine of use, and the degradation of Western values by the doctrine of unilateralism, mar the debate about Europe, too.

The deployment by NATO of theater nuclear forces—the Pershing II and cruise missiles—may be justified in two ways. The first is that NATO needs these weapons in order to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe. The second is that NATO needs these weapons in order not to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe.

The first view has been championed forthrightly by Edward Luttwak. He considers the conundrum that NATO will face in the event of a Soviet attack. Its conventional defenses may fail, he observes correctly, and it may be forced to resort to the use of battlefield nuclear weapons. The Soviets, presumably, will respond in kind, but they can also raise the stakes by threatening the cities of Europe with theater nuclear weapons, the intermediate range SS-20s, that are already abundantly in place. How could NATO meet such a threat? "A better response to such a Soviet threat," he writes,

> would be possible if by then NATO had acquired its own theater nuclear forces which, like the Soviet forces that already exist in considerable numbers, would be suitable to threaten not merely cities indiscriminately, but rather such specific targets as political and military command centers, airfields, nuclear storage sites, and even large concentrations of ground forces—that threat being all the more credible for being less catastrophic.

Once again, the counterforce chimera. It is even more of a chimera in the European setting, where the population is all around; there is no Nevada desert to make a counter-military strike look clean. And a counter-political strike is dirty everywhere. The military action contemplated by Luttwak will accomplish not the defeat of an army but the demise of a society. It is hard to understand the sense in which such an action will be "less catastrophic." Less than what? And for whom? "U.S. scenarios for limited war in the European theater do not amuse us," E. P. Thompson has complained. "This is where we happen to live." That they do. Arguments like Luttwak's only win sympathy for arguments like Thompson's.

But let us stay with Luttwak's strategy. The Russians have attacked, and the Pershings are there. They are used. And suddenly, according to Luttwak, it is an age of reason. "By far the most likely outcome is that a war would end very soon if any nuclear weapons, however small, were actually to be detonated by any side on any target." No theory of victory here, at least. Still, no man has been given this much to know. In the matter of the outcome of a nuclear war there are no experts. Luttwak is only speculating. He believes that a nuclear war will limit itself, and that this is "likely." But it is just as "likely" that it will not. The threshold, after all, will have been crossed. The unthinkable will not only have been thought; it will have been done. Surely, then, it may be done once more. It is impossible to predict the actions of statesmen and soldiers at such a terrible time, but this much seems evident—that each missile that will be launched will make it easier to launch another. If the difference between conventional weapons and nuclear weapons is not respected, there is no reason to believe that the difference between one type of nuclear weapon and another will be. The greater escalation makes the lesser escalation more likely, not less likely. Luttwak, however, argues the other way around. The use of nuclear weapons will end the use of nuclear weapons, he maintains. Such reasoning is not reassuring.

WHAT MAKES LUTTWAK so certain that the war will stay limited? "The shock effect upon leaders on both sides—but especially on the Soviet leaders who had started the war." This is a surprising endorsement of the good sense of the Soviets. That the Soviets would stay cool in a nuclear situation is to be wished. But it is, once again, a belief in reason when the hour is late. The Soviets, in any case, have made it known that they would interpret an attack by NATO as an attack by the United States. It is the official policy of the Russians to turn a theater nuclear war with Europe into a strategic nuclear war with the United States. If Luttwak does not believe that this is their intention, he must show why not. If he does believe that this is their intention, however, he must admit that after the Atlantic alliance has fired its Pershings, the limitation of the war to Europe is out of its hands.

Luttwak offers another reason for his sanguine scenario for nuclear war in Europe.

> The devastating psychological impact [of the use of nuclear weapons] upon the forces in the field would most likely arrest the conflict there and then. It is fully to be expected that military units whose men would see the flash, hear the detonation, feel the blast, or merely hear of such things, would swiftly disintegrate, except perhaps for a handful of units particularly elite. . . . The entire 'software' of discipline, or morale, of unit cohesion and *esprit de corps* . . . are simply not built to withstand such terror as nuclear weapons would cause—even if at the end of the day it were to be discovered that the dead on all sides are surprisingly few.

This last remark refers, presumably, to the casualties caused by tactical nuclear weapons; theater nuclear weapons would leave no such surprise for the day's end. Unfortunately it is not the case that battlefield nuclear weapons would bring a halt to the hostilities. In an admirable essay on "The Human Face of Deterrence," John Keegan has shown that troops may continue to fight even in the aftermath of such an attack. Keegan cites the remarkable resilience of German infantry at

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Cassino and at Normandy, where they were subjected to bombings so intense that they approached the level of a tactical nuclear burst. To the astonishment of the Allies, the enemy troops continued to fire their guns. Keegan attributes this perseverance to the durability of "instinctive habits of obedience" acquired as a result of countless drills in training. Keegan's skepticism may be carried further. The efficacy of tactical nuclear weapons depends upon their early use. If they do not stop the advancing Warsaw Pact army at once, they will quickly become too costly to use, because as the adversary army continued its advance it would come closer to NATO forces, and to the civilian population that these forces are present to protect. Tactical nuclear weapons used at that point in the fighting would turn upon their users.

There is no guarantee that battlefield nuclear weapons will limit the war. They cannot be counted upon to stop all the soldiers. Thus, it is said, NATO must have theater nuclear weapons waiting in the wings. But these weapons do not discriminate between soldiers and civilians, particularly not in the counter-political manner that Luttwak proposes they be used. They will destroy not the *esprit* but the *corps*. The "theater" will become a charnel-house. In short, such a war cannot, in good conscience, be called "limited." The United States, it is true, will be outside its "limits," though probably not for long. But for the people of Europe who are within its "limits," limited nuclear war is total nuclear war.

LIKE THE CONCEPTION of counterforce at the strategic level, the conception of counterforce at the theater level claims the cachet of deterrence. Luttwak concludes his argument for a war-fighting strategy for Europe with a short disquisition on deterrence. "Deterrence does not rest on the theoretical ultimate of all-out population destruction," he observes. "Whether nuclear or not, the workings of deterrence depend on threats of punishment that others will find believable. This requires that the act of retaliation be in itself purposeful, and less catastrophic than more." Luttwak's remark about "all-out population destruction" sounds a little like Rostow's remark about the resilience of the human race. It is true that deterrence does not work because everybody will die. Everybody will not. But the certainty that somebody will survive is hardly a warrant for fighting a nuclear war. Luttwak is arguing against a straw man. Nobody ever said that deterrence rests on the possibility of "all-out population destruction." What it rests on, rather, is the possibility of vast undifferentiated devastation. Yet the devastation imagined by a war-fighting strategy is highly differentiated. Military targets are differentiated from political targets, and both these targets are differentiated from civilian targets. Tactical nuclear weapons are differentiated from theater nuclear weapons, and both these weapons are differentiated from strategic nuclear weapons. The aim of all these differentiations is to weaken the compunctions of military commanders, to make a war that is without limit and without purpose seem "limited" and "purposeful." Deterrence, then, may be less than "all-out population destruction," but it is more than "purposeful" nuclear use.

The possibility of undifferentiated devastation, moreover, is perfectly "believable," in Luttwak's term; it is made believable by the power of an intermediate range missile to destroy its target by destroying the entire place where its target is to be found. The requirement that deterrence be "believable" is frequently used as an excuse for counterforce planning. In fact, deterrence does not require your enemy to believe that you will strike back; it requires only that he not believe that you will not. Deterrence does not, in other words, require certainty. Doubt is quite enough.

DETERRENCE is the real reason for the installation of the intermediate range missiles by NATO—deterrence, to be precise, at all levels. Deterrence at all levels does not now exist, and it is this that makes the use of theater nuclear weapons in Europe more likely. The peace movement, in other words, has it backward. It is in order *not* to fight a nuclear war limited to Europe that the missiles will be delivered to NATO this year. The last thing that the United States should do, if it intends to limit a nuclear war to Europe, is to put missiles in Europe that can reach the Soviet Union.

The decision to deploy the Pershing and the cruise was based upon a sound understanding of the political dangers posed by the present military balance in Europe. The Soviet superiority in theater nuclear weapons threatens Western Europe with political domination or physical destruction, because it discourages the United States from coming to Western Europe's defense. In the event of a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Warsaw Pact can inflict upon NATO a nuclear blow for which NATO cannot retaliate in kind. NATO must be made by the United States, the security of Europe rests on the readiness of the United States for suicide. And that, obviously, is no security at all. The Soviet Union and the surrender of Europe. As long as the intermediate-range missiles of the Russians are met only by the long-range missiles of the Americans, as long as the decision to move to the direst nuclear attack must be made by the United States, the security of Europe rests on the readiness of the United States for suicide. And that, obviously, is no security at all. The Pershing and the cruise were developed as a solution to this problem. In the words of Michael Howard, they are designed "to assuage the fears of Western Europeans that, confronted by a threat that did not extend to their own continent, the Americans would be effectively deterred from intervening." These missiles lower the cost of retaliation for the United States, and raise the cost of attack for the Soviet Union. They will be there not to be used, but to prevent their Soviet counterparts from being used. There is, after all, one way that nuclear war may be limited, and that is by the firing of the SS-20s at states

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that have no Pershings and cruise. Such a war will indeed be limited—to Western Europe.

These missiles make possible retaliation without escalation. In a word, they deter. They restore the mutual hostage relationship in which deterrence is said to consist; the present predicament may be characterized as a single-hostage relationship, with Western Europe as the hostage. Still, the problem of the alliance is not solved. The new weapons with which NATO will be furnished make it less probable that the United States will be laid waste for the sake of Europe, but only less probable. They do not make it impossible. It is easy to defend the NATO missile decision against the illusions of the peace movement, but it is hard to defend it without bitterness. For the Pershings and the cruise, as the governments of Western Europe freely admit, are still a way of tying America to Europe's fate; and this is necessary, as they do not freely admit, because Europe is not prepared to take responsibility for its fate on its own.

IF THE UNITED STATES ever fights a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, it will almost certainly not be because the Soviet Union attacked the United States. It will be because the Soviet Union attacked an ally of the United States. The war will not begin with a strategic nuclear exchange, but it will probably escalate to it. The defense policy of the Atlantic alliance is based upon the inexorability of escalation. The official metaphors for escalation are "chain of deterrence," "web of deterrence," "continuum of deterrence"; the new missiles will be installed to complete this chain, this web, this continuum. Deterrence must hold at all levels, if the worst nuclear fear of the age is not to come to pass. Thus, conventional warfare must be abjured, lest tactical theater nuclear weapons be used; tactical nuclear weapons must be abjured, lest theater nuclear weapons be used; theater nuclear weapons must be abjured, lest strategic nuclear weapons be used; and strategic nuclear weapons must be abjured. The promise of escalation is what stays everybody's hand. When there is peace, it is a promise of good. But when there is war, it is a promise of evil. The metaphors of deterrence are, after all, metaphors of entanglement. When deterrence fails, it may fail at all its levels. That is its dark side. The United States has remorselessly declared its intention, in its famous policy of "first use," to rescue Europe's armies by the use of nuclear weapons, that is, to raise a conventional war to a nuclear war. And the Soviet Union has declared its intention to interpret any nuclear attack by NATO as an attack by the United States—that is, to raise a theater nuclear war into a strategic nuclear war.

But it is not only doctrine that will make escalation inexorable. It is the real situation on the ground. The single most decisive fact about that situation is the inadequacy of our allies' conventional defenses. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are roughly equal in manpower, but the Warsaw Pact has particularly large advantages in tanks (2.64 to 1), artillery pieces (2.07 to 1), land-based bombers (4.83 to 1), fighters (5.07 to 1) and interceptors (7.14 to 1); and its supply lines are less of a problem than NATO's. (These figures are drawn from *The Military Balance 1982-83* of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which concludes that "the numerical balance over the last 20 years has moved slowly but steadily in favor of the East," while "the West has largely lost the technological edge which allowed NATO to believe that quality could substitute for numbers.") If a war goes badly, for this reason, there is escalation. A "first use" is really a last resort. In order to make a nuclear defense more credible (not least to the citizens of the democracies to be defended), the destructive consequences of first use were concealed for a time behind the doctrine of "flexible response," according to which the most horrible nuclear strikes would be averted, or in any case saved for last. The deficiencies in the doctrine of flexible response, however, have been amply documented. The less horrible strikes are pretty horrible. And the nuclear strikes would have to begin at once, as we have observed. But "political leaders would never sanction such early use of nuclear weapons," according to Lawrence Freedman (the author of *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy,* the best single book about strategic studies that I have read). Freedman concludes, instead, that "Western European leaders have long considered the real virtue of theater nuclear forces, e.g., the Pershing and the cruise, to be the link the weapons provide to the U.S. strategic arsenal."

THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, then, requires a readiness for nuclear war. Rostow, in a speech at Yale, made the point plainly. "There is no way to build an impermeable wall between the use of nuclear and conventional weapons," he said. "The President of the United States must never be put in a position where he would have to choose between abandoning a vital American interest and launching a nuclear war." Of course this has been precisely the position of every President since 1945; nuclear war in Europe has been avoided not because we were unwilling to launch it, but because political means for the resolution of crises have not yet failed. The weakness of NATO determines not merely its policy on defense, furthermore, but its policy on arms control as well. Rostow made the connection clear. "In order to prevent the unthinkable horror of nuclear war, we must enforce the rules of public order against all forms of aggression, conventional and nuclear." Or, more simply, "in order to eliminate nuclear war, you must eliminate war itself."

Now, one of the interesting things about Rostow's view is that it is shared by Schell. "In the present global political system," writes Schell,

> a leader of a nuclear power who comes to believe that his nation's vital interests are being threatened by another nuclear power faces a pair of alternatives that never confronted any statesmen of pre-nuclear times: he can acqui-

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esce in the aggression . . . or he can threaten to unleash a holocaust in which the life of mankind might be lost.

And there are implications for arms control, also much like Rostow's, only given more grandiloquently:

> For the world, in freeing itself on one burden, the peril of extinction, must inevitably shoulder another: it must assume full responsibility for settling human differences peacefully. . . . Nuclear disarmament cannot occur if conventional arms are left in place. . . . If we are serious about nuclear disarmament—the minimum technical requirement for real safety from extinction—then we must accept conventional disarmament as well.

Of course these men reason differently. Since we must fight wars, we must fight nuclear wars, reasons Rostow. Since we must not fight nuclear wars, we must not fight wars, reasons Schell. But there is, in the dystopia of Rostow and the utopia of Schell, a common assumption, which is that we no longer can fight conventional wars.

Can we? According to the four distinguished architects of deterrence who proposed that the United States adopt a policy of "no first use," we can.

No first use makes no sense in the context of the current conventional balance, as Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith almost acknowledged; no sooner had they pitched the idea than they were arguing "on behalf of strengthened conventional forces." They acknowledged, too, that "no one on either side could guarantee beyond all possible doubt that if conventional warfare broke out on a large scale there would in fact be no use of nuclear weapons." The Soviet Union, always on the alert for propaganda opportunities, made a declaration of no first use at the United Nations in June, shortly after the article in *Foreign Affairs* appeared. The United States, quite correctly, did not at all modify its policy as a result of the Soviet declaration. "We could not make that assumption about the Soviet leaders," the "Gang of Four" wrote in a premonitory passage; "and we must recognize," they continued, at great cost to their argument, "that the Soviet leaders could not make it about us. As long as the weapons themselves exist, the possibility of their use will remain."

AND YET the notion of no first use was greeted with great enthusiasm in the United States, despite the rather obvious fact that it struck at the foundation of European defense at a time of real conventional weakness. The reason for this enthusiasm is not far to seek. The notion of no first use spoke for a hope that the United States has hidden for the entire history of the alliance—the hope to which Secretary of State Haig referred when he retorted that no first use would "make the world safe for conventional warfare." The world, of course, has always been safe for conventional warfare. No first use dares to suggest that it still is. It denies the most dangerous discontinuity of the nuclear age. There is a thrilling thesis about history in no first use, which is that there remains before us not the choice between peace and extinction, which is the conventional wisdom about the nuclear age, but the choice between peace and war. No first use, in other words, is a proposal for the normalization of the nuclear world. For the nuclear world will be normal when wars may be waged between states that have nuclear weapons without their being used. In such a world, escalation is no longer inexorable. The defense of Europe no longer asks the sacrifice of America. No first use is addressed to America's nerves, which have been sorely exposed by NATO.

NO FIRST USE owes its popularity to what may be called the fantasy of the firebreak. The firebreak is the technical term for the difference between conventional war and nuclear war; it is the opposite of escalation. The firebreak is a worthy objective. It is not hard, in the nuclear age, to praise conventional war. The smaller scale of the catastrophe is, of course, what most recommends a conventional war. But there are other such recommendations. Nuclear weapons do not deter anything except nuclear weapons; the years since 1945 have been riddled with confrontations and conflicts. Moreover, nuclear weapons are a military deterrent, but not a political deterrent. Perhaps the best proof of this is the postwar period in Europe. The Soviet Union created its empire in Eastern Europe in the very years that the United States enjoyed not merely nuclear superiority, but a nuclear monopoly. Insofar as it warns against too great a reliance upon a nuclear defense, then, no first use is a constructive suggestion.

Except for the Europeans. They hate no first use. "How will we fight back?" asks the editor of *Die Zeit*. "Given a renunciation of first use," four fearful West German defense specialists remind us, "conventional war in Europe would once again become possible." It is true that as you decrease the possibility of nuclear war, you increase the possibility of conventional war; but this would seem worth the gamble, especially for Germany, which would probably be annihilated by the nuclear conflagration in question. The Germans, however, prefer the possibility of annihilation to the preparedness for something less. This has been the case since the 1950s, when a nuclear bias was introduced into the force structure and the defense doctrines of NATO. Since then it has been fatalistically assumed that NATO will never be able to match the Warsaw Pact in conventional strength. This fatalism, however, is related to finance. The recovery of conventional parity by Western Europe, it is commonly believed, demands an increase in defense spending so great that it might place the entire economies of these countries on a different footing. This is an exaggeration; according to General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander at NATO, the Soviet advantage can be offset by an increase of only 1 percent in the members states' defense spending. The general is probably too sanguine. Still, for the Europeans that is 1 percent too many. They prefer the nuclear peril to higher taxes. That is what is so galling about the defense policy

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of the Atlantic alliance. It is not only themselves that our allies place in jeopardy. Their economic objection to a conventional defense has consequences for the United States as well. Their pleas for the American nuclear guarantee mean that they would sacrifice us for the sake of their standard of living.

If the firebreak is a fantasy, it is not America's fault. Nor is it America's fault if doubts about the alliance are heard on this side of the Atlantic. (Intellectuals as different as Ronald Steel and Irving Kristol have voiced such doubts.) It must be understood, in the matter of NATO, who is dragging whom to their doom. E. P. Thompson cries that he is "not ready to accept the obliteration of the material resources and inheritance of this island, and of some half of its inhabitants, in order to further the strategies of NATO." This is sheer effrontery. The world is the other way around. It is the material resources and the inhabitants of the United States that will be obliterated in the defense of NATO, not the material resources and inhabitants of NATO that will be obliterated in defense of the United States. The installation of the Pershing and the cruise—which Thompson opposes, of course—will correct the apportionment of risk within the alliance, but only slightly. If these missiles are ever launched against the Soviet Union, deterrence will have failed not only for Europe, but for the United States, too. Against E.P. Thompson, who portrays NATO as a collection of small nations cowed by the United States into serving its interests, NATO must be defended as a community of principle. But along come the West German defense specialists and they do not speak of a community of principle. They speak only of "a community of risk." This, too, is sheer effrontery. They are asking the United States to do for them what they will not do for themselves. (The conservative government of Helmut Kohl proposes to spend less on defense than the liberal government of Helmut Schmidt.) And they are asking the civilization of Europe to countenance its own end so that they may compete in the world's markets.

NATO is a security arrangement based upon a common morality. For moral ends the United States has made an extraordinary commitment to Europe. It has "extended" deterrence. No first use would undermine that commitment. It would take deterrence back; it would, therefore, weaken NATO as a security arrangement. Still, no first use is a noble idea, refuted by an ignoble reality. It intends to put nuclear weapons out of play. But nuclear weapons can be put out of play in only two ways—deterrence and disarmament. No first use cripples deterrence but does not call for disarmament. And it encourages the delusion that words will do away with the nuclear danger, when only deeds will. For deterrence to work, weapons must have been made. For disarmament to work, weapons must have been unmade. The announcement that the weapons are there but there is no need to worry means nothing.

IV.

And So, Deterrence

THE GREAT NUCLEAR DEBATE, THEN, HAS consisted mainly in the trashing of deterrence. It is trashed on the right and trashed on the left. There is arresting agreement on this matter. In 1973, for example, the present Undersecretary for Policy in the Department of Defense, Fred C. Iklé, published an article called, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" which helped inaugurate the right-wing revisionism that has come to rule; and in 1981 E. P. Thompson published "Deterrence and Addiction," a lecture given before the British Association for the Advancement of Science. These texts must be read together if our full fall from our senses is to be understood. The planner and the professor concur that it is the dogma of deterrence that stands in our way. They think it is immoral. According to Iklé, it is really "mutually assured genocide," and "Tomas de Torquemada, who burned ten thousand heretics at the stake, could claim principles more humane than our nuclear strategy"; and according to Thompson, it is "inducing nuclear war," and is "carrying us towards the Final Solution." And they think it is irrational. According to Iklé, "there exists no rational basis" for deterrence, because "those calculated decisions which our deterrent seeks to prevent are not the sole processes that could lead to nuclear war. . . . We are making survival depend on the rationality of all future leaders in all major wars"; and according to Thompson, deterrence "proceeds by attributing a rationality to states which can rarely be found in History . . . untroubled by those non-rational surges (of panic or of national self-assertion) which mark the historical record. . . . What if the Russians are playing a different game from the Americans, and each ignores or misunderstands the other's rules?" Then the planner and the professor part company. The one takes to the Pentagon, to find ways to win with nuclear weapons. The other takes to the streets, to find ways to abolish them. Many follow both. And the only idea that has so far come between us and these weapons, and equilibrated this evil world, is left almost friendless.

There is a sense in which deterrence is certainly immoral. It is a promise of murder. We prevent them from using their weapons by threatening to kill millions of innocent people, and by making them believe that we mean it; and they do the same. If the deed cannot be called moral, the threat cannot be called moral. This is the objection that is made in the pastoral letter on nuclear weapons drafted for the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. "The nature of deterrence in the nuclear age has raised the most severe moral questions," it warns. "Under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass slaughter be used for the

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purpose of destroying population centers. . . . Our condemnation applies especially to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have been already struck." Such a retaliatory strike, or rather the plausible threat of it, is of course the essence of deterrence. It must be said to the credit of the bishops that they have correctly decoded the Pentagon's present counter-political strategy, which is the murder of innocents by another name; and it must be said to the discredit of the Pentagon that its plans for the fighting of a nuclear war have been so deceitfully disguised as deterrence that doubts about the one have led many to doubts about the other.

There is a sense, too, in which deterrence is irrational. It is irrational to think highly of human nature. Our intelligence has placed intercontinental missiles at the disposal of our instincts. Nothing in the past can have been so attractive to the aggressive drives of men, so seductive to their desire for self-destruction, as nuclear weapons. "Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man": Freud made this observation a full fifteen years before the explosion at Almagordo. No policy on nuclear weapons, except for the immediate unscrewing of every one of them, can guarantee against an accidental war, but there is something even worse to consider. Who can say with any certainty that there will never be somebody with a finger on the button who will not want to push it? The world may one day pay dearly for somebody's experience of his or her parents. This is the happiest time in history for sick minds.



'DETERRENCE' BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

Deterrence, moreover, is not peace. It is a condition of crisis. Indeed, deterrence is another word for danger, a brief expression for the first stage of nuclear confrontation, for the fact that what we fear most may have already begun. Deterrence is often said to have "worked," and if anything has "worked," it has; but we cannot be sure. Even if it "worked" in the past, we cannot be confident that it will "work" in the future. (Deterrence must be the only public arrangement that is a total failure if it is successful 99.9 percent of the time.) Thompson is correct that deterrence is "a counter-factual proposition that does not admit of proof." To be a little more precise, deterrence is a proposition that may be known to be false, but not to be true. When it fails, we will know that it was false, or a few of us will. Until then we will persist in believing that it is true, and not entirely without reason. Deterrence is probably more than a necessary fiction and probably less than a law of history.

The criticism of deterrence, then, is not quite groundless. But many of the conclusions drawn from this criticism are. The alternatives to deterrence that have been proposed are no more moral or rational; they are in fact much less so. The razing of Moscow known as "decapitation" is ethically no more satisfactory than the razing of Moscow known as "mutual assured destruction." Nor is it particularly moral to place our populations in still greater peril simply by taking back the threat, as some suggest, or taking back the weapons; the only thing more menacing to our security than nuclear strength is nuclear weakness. Any scheme for dealing with the nuclear danger that would disarm only one side, or upset the balance between the two sides, would leave us more exposed, not less. It is just as irrational to invite a war with ICBMs as it is to fight a war with ICBMs.

The proper conclusion to be drawn from the shortcomings of deterrence is, rather, that deterrence is not enough. It must not be rejected. It must be completed. And it is completed by disarmament, in the form of arms control. Deterrence and disarmament are complementary concepts. The proper policy for the nuclear powers may be put this way: no deterrence without disarmament, no disarmament without deterrence. But this is a slogan, whose meaning must be spelled out.

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The need of deterrence for disarmament is pretty plain. The existence of such weapons means that we already exist in a state of emergency. They simply cannot be left to the pacific tendencies of people in power. They must be controlled, limited, reduced, and abolished—that is, they must be more than deterred. It follows from the nature of the emergency, furthermore, that all this must happen bilaterally. Anybody who is sincerely concerned about the nuclear danger will agree that the world will be no safer if cuts are made in only one arsenal. Nuclear superiority does not lessen the possibility of nuclear use; the United States dropped the bomb on Hiroshima when it had a nuclear monopoly. (It is worth noting, too, that if Japan had had the bomb, Hiroshima would not have been hit, because the United States would have been deterred.) The only real disarmament, then, is mutual disarmament. It is the only form of disarmament that will not advance the national interests of one side at the expense of the other's, and the only form of disarmament that will advance the higher interests of both.

THE NEED of disarmament for deterrence is perhaps less plain. Put simply, deterrence serves as the proper regulating principle for arms control. It determines how many weapons, and of what kind, may be limited or reduced without upsetting the balance—without tempting either side to think that there would be a greater advantage in using force than in controlling it. There follows from deterrence the ideal for disarmament, which is the ideal of stockpiles shrinking more or less symmetrically. They continue to deter each other as they are diminished; and if they did not deter, they would not be diminished. This is not very rousing—unlike, say, Schell's summons to "rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons"—but it is very responsible.

Some say that the reliance upon negotiations to rid us of the risk is a counsel of despair. As anybody knows who has read Gerard Smith's comfortless account of the SALT I talks, there is some truth to this. Arms control talks have almost always smothered their purpose with the political ends of the parties. In such critical areas as strategic nuclear weapons they have not been able to agree even upon the definition of the reality that they have been mandated to modify; different measures of nuclear strength are proposed in order to disguise advantages that nobody is prepared to give away. The effort at the table has often been not to renounce, but to retain, as many weapons as possible. To be sure, SALT I and SALT II were not exactly futile; there are fifty thousand nuclear weapons alive in the world, and every cut counts. The symbolic significance of nuclear negotiations, furthermore, should not be sacrificed. But arms control is not the solution to the nuclear problem, at least not for a long time to come. Ronald Reagan has called for the reduction by a third of the nuclear warheads in the land-based and sea-based missiles of both superpowers, to be followed by an "equal ceiling" on the number of land-based warheads. George Kennan has called for "an across-the-board reduction by 50 percent of the nuclear arsenals now being maintained." Both are fine proposals, and both would leave intact the power to destroy the world. That is the most pressing reason for preserving the doctrine of deterrence—these missiles and warheads are not going away. If you do not believe that we should unilaterally disarm, and you do not believe that we should fight a war, and you do not believe that the arms race should forever be run, then you must believe in deterrence.

THIS LAST POINT should be clarified. The relationship of deterrence to the arms race is a matter of dispute. It is true that there has been no military buildup in the atomic age that has not been made in the name of deterrence, and in many cases (the "bomber gap" and the "missile gap") its name was taken in vain. Deterrence has become an idea behind which a major sector of the American economy frequently hides. This is the version of deterrence that does not include a principle of limits. It is, in this version, a purely relative idea—we must have whatever they have. And if they have more, then so must we. Such a doctrine of keeping up is a perfect rationale for an arms race. Strategic stability is a worthy goal, but strategic stability applies also to the most swollen arsenals, which is exactly the present predicament. The other side is allowed to raise the ante, and to dictate the size and style of our forces. It is not on the basis of this version of deterrence, then, that the arms race may be restrained.

There is another version of deterrence, however, which flies in the face of the arms race. This version originates not in the idea of strategic stability, but in the idea of mutual assured destruction, which it takes very seriously. The strategic criterion for the research, development, and production of nuclear weapons is taken to be simply the capacity to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor. During the McNamara administration at the Pentagon, when the idea of mutual assured destruction was adopted as American policy, such unacceptable damage was deemed to be 20 to 33 percent of the Soviet population and 50 to 75 percent of Soviet industry. Obviously a lower level of damage would be equally unacceptable. The point is that whatever the definition of unacceptable damage, the capacity to inflict it already exists. It existed twenty years ago. The manufacture of nuclear weaponry beyond the requirements of assured destruction is redundant; and according to this version of deterrence, the arms race is exactly that—an exercise in redundancy.

There is a kind of redundancy, of course, that deterrence requires. The United States must ready itself with the ability to strike at the Soviet Union after it has itself been struck, and so its forces are structured in a "triad" of land, sea, and air forces, each of which can do the deadly work of the other. But the arms race is a redundancy not of structure, which is necessary for security,

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UNEMPLOYED... THANKS TO HIS UNION



For Mac McConnell, these have not been the golden years. At age 66, he suffers from high blood pressure, has been unemployed since 1978 and is deprived of a pension earned by years of back-breaking work.

But that's only part of his ordeal that has included attacks on his home and car, eight slashed tires and fleeing for his life down a Colorado highway, pursued by three cars that nearly drove him off the road.

Mac paid the price. His crime was his family's need for his pension. His judge and jury were union bosses who condemned one brave man who refused to go along with their plans.

In 1977, Mac was a steelworker in Colorado's Gardner-Denver plant. When union bosses ordered a strike, Mac had to obey or risk stiff union fines and discipline.

But Mac was trapped when the company announced that anyone who didn't return to work would lose his job. Mac had only a year and a half to work before he could collect his pension, so he resigned from the union and returned to his job. A month later, the strike ended, the company rehired many strikers, and Mac's ordeal began.

Threatening phone calls and verbal abuse were only the beginning of a reign of terror that lasted almost a year. Mac and a handful of co-workers who wanted to save their jobs found their machinery vandalized. Windows in Mac's home were shot out, and a colleague found her car ashtray loaded with explosives.

By mid-1978, Mac was understandably a physical and emotional wreck. In desperation, he finally quit his job. He was later hired at another plant, but the harassment followed him. Within a few weeks he was forced to leave his job, just months short of receiving his pension. He was deprived of his health and life insurance and part of his Social Security benefits. He has been unemployed ever since.

But Mac didn't give up: "I feel it's time for people to stand up and be heard. As a veteran, I've done it once and I can do it again. I have a moral and religious obligation to fight for what I think is right, or to fight against what I think is wrong."

Mac wrote the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation. We accepted his case and are fighting for $650,000 in damages from the United Steelworkers for intentionally inflicting emotional distress and deliberately interfering with his employment.

We're helping Mac and everyone else we can. Currently, the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation is supporting 250 cases across the country, involving union violence, illegal union political spending, academic and political freedom, and other basic employee rights.

If you think people like Mac McConnell ought to be heard, write us. We'd like to hear from you, and so would Mac McConnell.

National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation
Dept. NRP
8001 Braddock Road
Springfield, VA 22160

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but of numbers, which is necessary for business. "And the result," as Kennan remarked, "is that today we have achieved, we and the Russians together, in the creation of these devices and their means of delivery, levels of redundancy of such grotesque dimensions as to defy rational understanding." Kennan then scoffs at "something called deterrence," again from the perfectibilian point of view, but it is precisely the technological and military situation to which he points that is deterrence's reason for being. Unless a weapon must be made it must not be made. This is what is known as "minimal deterrence." In the early Nixon years it was known as "sufficiency." It would lead to a kind of selective freeze, with some projects of research and development properly frozen.

DETERRENCE, finally, is more than a military dispensation. It is a political dispensation, too. It permits nations that have the power to kill each other to prosecute their interests without killing each other. This is part of its offense to many in the peace movement, who want everything called off until the nuclear problem is solved. The most prominent spokesman for the suspension of politics due to the nuclear peril is George Kennan. In a recent speech in Frankfurt, Kennan succinctly delivered his well-known views on the way in which American policy toward the Soviet Union must adapt to the nuclear condition. "We must immediately stop every type of economic warfare . . . these are means for preparing a new war, not the means for preventing one." And "we have to put an end to the often systematic condemnation of another great people and its government—a condemnation which if not stopped will really make war inevitable by making it seem inevitable." And we must "exercise restraint in the tragic question of human rights and national independence," bearing in mind always "that a new war would not help those who are considered victims of Communist arbitrariness." The argument is simple. Because of the possibility of nuclear war, the United States may do nothing, in words or in deeds, to express its profound philosophical differences with the Soviet Union. It may challenge Soviet influence, and the Soviet ideal of life, only in ways that will not matter.

To "put an end to the systematic condemnation" of the Soviet Union, however, is to put an end to the telling of the truth. (Kennan disagrees. In 1976 he told an interviewer that "I can see very little merit in organizing ourselves to defend from the Russians the porno shops in central Washington. In fact, the Russians are much better in holding pornography at bay than we are." They certainly are.) Furthermore, to "exercise restraint in the tragic question of human rights" is to deprive the victims of "Communist arbitrariness" of their only hope. The course that Kennan counsels is the compromise of America's deepest convictions. It is also political paralysis. A "tragic question" is a question you can do nothing about. Kennan is a man unnerved by a nightmare. He would unnerve his countrymen, too. He would have them believe that the tightening of credit to the Russians, or the public support of Soviet dissidents, or the linkage of favorable trade agreements to the free emigration of Jews and others from the Soviet Union, will lead to war. This is especially odd in a man who denies that the Soviets are "aggressively disposed."

There is a part of politics, to be sure, that must never be linked to the rivalry between the superpowers, and that is nuclear politics. Arms control must not be a pawn in the game. It must be recognized as a different dimension, and dissociated from the ordinary political world. But ordinary politics must go on. Just as the bomb must not become a tool of political principle, political principle must not become a tool of the bomb. It is the divorce of the two that deterrence accomplishes. Deterrence does not depart from the consideration of the Soviet Union as an enemy—as an enemy of which the United States may be proud. Deterrence and arms control are quite compatible with the cold war. Their objective is simply to keep the cold war cold.

THERE IS NO contradiction between anti-Communism and arms control. But it works both ways. If anti-Communists must not be daunted by arms controllers, arms controllers must not be daunted by anti-Communists. For the ultimate reason for the absence of a contradiction between anti-Communism and arms control is the grotesque size of the nuclear arsenal itself. The United States has 1,052 intercontinental ballistic missiles, on which there are 2,152 warheads; and 520 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, on which there are 4,768 warheads; and 316 long-range bombers. In this decade, furthermore, the United States will deploy air-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles, making its strategic triad into a strategic pentad. The requirements of deterrence, then, are well satisfied. This means that a good deal of arms controlling may take place before this country, and the campaign against totalitarianism, is put in jeopardy. Because the numbers are so great, we have room in which to move. Let us, to show that we are serious about arms control, volunteer to take apart some of what we have, because the gesture may make a change in the hearts of Americans and in the hearts of Russians, and let us default on the Polish debt. These actions will cost us nothing in security. They will profit us much in morality.

This, then, is the situation. There is the party of peace, and the party of war, and the party of deterrence. The party of deterrence is too little esteemed by the public. This is not surprising; no masses ever marched in the name of realism. But the public must be made to see that freedom's immediate future lies with this party, and that there is much work to be done. "It is not for you to finish the work," said a rabbi of the second century, "but neither are you free to desist from it." The rabbi was martyred by the Romans, but he spoke like a man who knew he would be survived. □

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

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STANLEY KAUFFMANN ON FILMS

Pakula's Choice

Stingo comes back to his newly rented room in the Brooklyn boarding house bearing a carton of Spam packages on his shoulder, looking apprehensively at the ceiling of his room. The sounds of what is presumably a torrid sexual encounter are coming from above. The carton totters on Stingo's shoulder as he totters into his

Sophie's Choice
(Universal Pictures)

room. I hoped—in vain. The sounds so unnerve Stingo that he stumbles into cinematic cliché: he spills the packages. I'd hoped he wouldn't. The chandelier in his ceiling is shaking. Again I hoped—in vain—that the camera wouldn't go in for a close-up. In it went, close, so that we couldn't miss the shaking chandelier. Thus, from the start, platitude flecks the direction of the film that Alan J. Pakula has made from William Styron's novel *Sophie's Choice*.

In some ways, however, the film is better than the book. Primary benefit: we are spared almost all of Styron's grandiose prose. It is only when the unseen Josef Sommer, as the older Stingo, reads brief sections on the soundtrack, for commentary or transition, that we realize how lucky we are: whatever there is of merit in the book has been freed by the film from its prison of gummy rhetoric. Also, though the script necessarily condenses, it does not significantly reduce. It's a sorry comment on any novel that a film can improve its realization of character and place; but it's true here. Sophie is more vivid than she was in the book; and a glance of the camera can eliminate pages and pages of detail that Styron laid in, stratum after stratum, in language blended of Dreiser and Warren and Wolfe, then pumped full of sophomoric exaltation. Those glances of the camera further indicate how the film medium in general has liberated the novel in general from the drudgeries that Styron still piles on it—a liberation exploited by the best of contemporary novelists here and abroad. Pakula's film, even though forced to omit some of the better bits in Styron's book, demonstrates (unintentionally) that Styron's whole view of novel-writing is tediously antiquated.

But in other ways the film is just as unsatisfactory as the book, because it's inseparably strapped to basic flaws. The story has no center, no protagonist. To whom does the action of the novel happen? What *does* happen in the book, other than the gradual revelation of action that has already happened? Sophie has long ago made her choice; all that is left for her in dramatic action is to reveal it. Her lover Nathan is not a character, he's a pathological case; he evokes little more than, at best, pathos and a wish that someone would phone for an ambulance. Stingo is in very nearly the same position as Christopher in *I Am a Camera*. He watches, consoles, and grows wiser through watching. But, despite the fights that he witnesses and the picnics and games that he joins, what does he actually *do* in the story? In the novel he could function as our eyes and and could filter what he saw through the perspectives of the intervening decades. In front of the camera, Stingo merely occupies space without dramatic justification; he's a confidant posing as a protagonist. When he arrived in Brooklyn (Styron tells us in his priceless prose) Stingo's spirit was

> unacquainted with love and all but a stranger to death. [This means that he had not yet made love; does it also mean that he had not yet died?] I could not realize then [O venerable phrase! Often it's rendered as "Little did I know at the time. . . ."] how soon I would encounter both of these things [*things*?] embodied in the human passion and human flesh [as distinct from horse passion and horse flesh?] from which I had absented myself in my smug and airless self-deprivation.

Or, less smugly and airlessly, he had not yet got laid or seen a corpse. But almost all that Stingo does, in both film and book, is to "encounter" these "things" as an observer.

Inevitably the film was bound to be more interesting in its flashbacks than in its "present" action. But in those flashbacks, the film underscores a grossness in the book.

All through his career, Styron has been in search of evil—not inauthentic villainy but evil that would be credible for the contemporary reader. I won't trace that career here; but it seems reasonable to assume that he felt he had reached the Unholy Grail when he lit upon the Holocaust as a subject. One of the novel's epigraphs is from Malraux: " . . . I seek that essential region of the soul where absolute evil confronts brotherhood." What more absolute evil than the Holocaust, what starker confrontation with brotherhood? But the facts of Auschwitz were not enough for Styron: he had to contrive a Big Moment to cap them. (I don't remotely contend that such horrors did not happen: I'm speaking only of Styron's contrivance.) He had to devise a theatrical zinger to top the Holocaust. In Auschwitz a diabolical German Army doctor forces Sophie to choose between her two children: one is to live, one to die. If she doesn't choose, both will die. With one flip of his masterly hand, Styron turns the Holocaust and Malraux's absolute evil into melodrama. How eas-

FILMS WORTH SEEING

La Femme Enfant. Raphaele Billet-doux's first feature is a delicate story of innocent love between a man and a child, with Klaus Kinski mutedly appealing as the man.

Gandhi. Not boring. That negative statement is needed to wipe away dreads. Excellent acting, plus adequate direction, make this long (though synoptic) biography vivid.

Smithereens. Susan Seidelman's first feature, about the SoHo rock scene, goes past glib naturalism to a unique vision.

The Verdict. Paul Newman all the way. Sidney Lumet has directed with a knowledgeable eye, the story of a drunken lawyer's comeback is good enough, but it's Newman all the way.

SK

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ily we can envision a nineteenth-century theater poster of the scene, the distraught Sophie hugging her two children, the evil doctor leering at her, the background streaked with red, the title coursing along the bottom. In the film as in the book, the long-delayed relevation of her choice, a secret revealed to at least one person, is what, I infer, frees Sophie to die. But the film provides even less explanation than the book as to why she chose the son over the daughter; and the film provides nothing of the doctor's reason for forcing the choice on her. (In the book Styron carpenters some mechanics that allow Sophie to overhear conversation about the doctor's background. He was in fact a very religious man. Stingo deduces that the doctor committed a great sin so that he could repent greatly. Pallid Dostoevsky is used to aggrandize old-fashioned hokum.)

I HAVE BEEN treating the novel as inseparable from the film because *Sophie's Choice* has been read by many people who may see the film; for the same reason, I haven't sketched the story. Pakula wrote his own screenplay. The condensations were inevitable, of course (even so, the film runs over two and a half hours); but, though one cannot blame him for the organic defects in the book, one can still deplore Pakula's Choice. Cinematically speaking, he has chosen tough nuts before, notably *All the President's Men* where, essentially, he had to make a film about typing—two reporters typing away. But this time his penchant for the cinematically difficult has led him into the amorphous and flaccid. And, though he showed in *President's Men* some touches of style, here he shows only a weakness for calendar art.

The cinematographer, Nestor Almendros, has previously done much wonderful work, but collaborating with Pakula, he frequently sinks into prettiness or imitation. The shot in which we discover Nathan "conducting" Beethoven's Ninth in his room, with four or five reflections of him in the panels of his bay window, is pseudo Welles. The misty twilight window-seat shot with Sophie and Stingo, which is where the flashback narrative begins and ends, is sheer Maxfield Parrish. And the tilted-camera views of Brooklyn Bridge are like hand-me-down Joseph Stella.

But Almendros photographs Meryl Streep excellently, which is hardly an incidental matter since her performance of Sophie is the film's sole achievement.

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

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

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To begin with, she looks more translucently beautiful than ever, and she has the Polish accent right. (I know; some of my best friends are Polish!) What Streep has wrought, possibly with Pakula's help, is a psychological verity for Sophie that she reveals through patterns of motion: she seems often to be moving sideways to avoid confrontation, she seems to be shunning the close scrutiny of others. Yes, of course, she often faces people, often embraces, kisses, converses with them, but the overall impression of her movement is sidling, gently attempting to hide herself in open space. Through this kinetic concept, Streep gives Sophie an aura of concealment. We know, without any grimaces or meaningful sighs, that she is not revealing her whole self to anyone, including her lover. When the truth about her father arrives, when we learn of her "choice," they seem like resolutions of suspended chords.

Sometimes Pakula hands the picture over to Streep: the camera fixes on her in medium close-up and, virtually without any change of shot, she tells a long story. It's what Bergman has done a number of times with Ullmann, and it's been done before with Streep. (It's done even in her recent abysmal thriller *Still of the Night*.) She handles these moments like a virtuoso—a compliment that contains a hint of worry. Virtuosos like John Wood or George C. Scott can grow to consume their roles rather than portray them. Streep is nowhere near that solipsism yet, but she is at the point where her knowledge of her excellence has begun to accompany the excellence itself.

This is not a quibble: it's a concern for a major talent. Here are two moments that are wonderful but in which we are aware that she knows it. When she first talks about her father, she sits on a piano bench, playing with a feather boa that hangs about her neck. She plays "off" the boa adroitly, but cleverly. Later she recalls a moment when, after she had reached Sweden following her rescue, she felt that Christ had turned away from her. Listen to what she does with the one word "Christ": the tiny pause just before it, the slow formation of the first consonants, the suspension of the middle, the almost reluctant close of the word. She makes the monosyllable an utterance. It's wonderful. Very, very few American actors could do it, and it's something worth being able to do. Still, it's noticeable.

None of which is to deny that the value of the film is in Streep's richness. Pakula even closes the picture, as Stingo trudges back across the Brooklyn Bridge to Manhattan, with a Botticellian image of the now-dead Sophie hanging over him in the sky. (Just so you'll know he'll never forget her, folks.)

Kevin Kline, as Nathan, works feverishly. He has great energy and some fire, but he cannot fuse the fragments of this demented character into—if the phrase is possible—a schizoid whole. We get a series of ecstatic and furious bits. Peter MacNicol, the Stingo, is a pleasant youth. It's hard to believe that he has served a hitch in the Marines; it's harder still to believe that Sophie would have wanted him as even a one-night lover. MacNicol does nothing wrong; but he is less like a young man trembling on the edge of a life in art than a sensitive high-school poet who wishes he could make the basketball team and attract girls.

CORRECTION:

Due to an editorial error, the meaning of a sentence in Anthony Storr's review of *Freud and Man's Soul* by Bruno Bettelheim was inverted. The sentence should have read: "But Freud seems never to have lost his belief in science, which he favorably contrasts with religion in his late work *The Future of an Illusion*."

DEATH TO THE DICTATOR

A Coin in Nine Hands by Marguerite Yourcenar translated by Dori Katz in collaboration with the author

(Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 174 pp., $11.95)

Marguerite Yourcenar, the first woman ever to be admitted to the Academie Française, lives on Mount Desert Island in Maine and writes solely in French. There is something fitting about the isolation implied by these facts. Her physical distance from her Belgian homeland and her psychological distance from the country she has adopted combine to give a picture of someone watching the word at one remove—as Marguerite Yourcenar most certainly does. Her concern is man's relationship with history. Her characters are most often tiny, lonely figures in a vortex of political events.

A Coin in Nine Hands—in French, *Denier du Reve*—is her third volume of fiction. It was written in 1934, some twenty years before *Memoirs of Hadrian*, and was considerably revised by the author in 1959. In an afterword to the later version, she explains that the revision was intended "to create a more complete, hence more particularized presentation of certain episodes, to allow a more penetrating psychological development, to simplify and clarify, and if possible, to enrich and add depth to the text." It is not, therefore, a matter of mere editing, and readers of French who can compare the two versions will probably learn something valuable about how a writer's skills may be refined with the years. "The opportunity of expressing ideas and emotions that were still mine," Marguerite Yourcenar says, "with improved craftsmanship and through the insights gleaned from a longer human experience, seemed to me too precious not to be accepted with joy and humility."

The coin of the title is a ten-lire piece that travels in a near circle around an anti-Fascist plot to assassinate Mussolini. Paolo Farina, abandoned by his young wife Angiola, gives the coin to a prostitute, Lina Chiari. Lina buys a lipstick from Giulio Lovisi, who in turn buys candles from Rosalia di Credo; and Rosalia pays Marcella Ardeati to fetch her some live embers. It is Marcella who is plotting to assassinate the Dictator. First, though, she passes the coin to her estranged husband, Dr. Sarte, as token payment for his gun. Dr. Sarte buys flowers for a woman he meets in a sleazy encounter at a movie theater. The flower-seller, Mother Dida, gives the coin to a "beggar"—actually Clement Roux, an artist, who tosses it into a fountain. It is finally retrieved by Oreste Marinunzi,

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who drinks himself into oblivion while waiting for his fourth child to be born.

These characters are not so ill-assorted as they may seem. First, they are linked by small coincidences, in ways that they themselves seldom realize. Rosalia the candle-seller, for instance, is actually the sister of that Angiola who abandoned her husband. And it's Angiola whom Dr. Sarte encounters at the movie theater. Giulio Lovisi, purveyor of lipsticks, is father-in-law to Carlo Stevo, the anti-Fascist who is Marcella's comrade-in-arms and the source of her political inspiration. And it's another comrade-in-arms who chances to help the aging artist home that night. Human beings, we're shown, are more closely connected than they know. Their muddled paths cross and recross, eddying around the central events of history.

Second, the characters are linked by the pathos, if not the outright tragedy, of their lives. They endure faithlessness, thanklessness, unhappy marriages, or old age. Lina Chiari is dying of cancer with no one to tell about it. Mother Dida is cursed with greed. Even Dr. Sarte, rich and successful, is disgusted by the stupidity of his life. Every person in this book is abjectly lonely.

BUT BEFORE YOU avert your eyes from so much misery, take another look. *A Coin in Nine Hands* is saved from grimness by the tone of its narrative voice, which is as pure and unadorned as that of a folktale. Events are stated so directly that—as in a folktale—they appear to be purposeful. The reader never doubts that there's a point to it all; and where there's a point, there's hope. "Even music," a church organist feels, "had its moments of emptiness and disgust when Bach was nothing but complicated noise; then, all at once, this mediocre musician would be lifted to the heavens on the wings of a fugue." A poor priest is burdened by his family's demands, by church politics and unseemly cravings, but

> at night, on his hard bed, the old priest would suddenly wake up filled with joy and murmur 'God . . . God . . . ' as if dazed by an ever-new discovery granted only to him to make. . . .

Clement Roux, in a long and wonderful passage, muses upon the meaning of his life: "Two years of love; a child with a little white collar in the paintings of 1905, who now sells cars; another child who died. . . ." A young revolutionary, considering the would-be assassin Marcella Ardeati, tells himself, "Accept even this sensual incompatability: she was closer to you than any woman ever will be, but you couldn't stand the oily, spicy smell of her hair. . . ." This same young revolutionary is astonished to recover a memory of escaping as a child from his native country; what he remembers is not the danger and discomfort that worried his elders, but the river islands submerged by spring floods, the cuckoos calling from opposite banks. Like Rome itself—a hauntingly beautiful and mysterious presence in this novel—those little islands endure.

Small human moments, then, set up a subtle tension against larger political moments. Each of these characters leads an intensely private life in which the Dictator is only a figure at the fringes—a force, but not an explicitly felt force. Mussolini is never named, in fact, but is often referred to as Caesar, as if he were playing a stage role filled by endlessly replaceable actors—"a man you want to kill, who, dead, will rise again like a target in a shooting gallery, a man who thinks he can shape the future by banging with his fists." He is clearly powerful—he's the center pole of the plot—but in another sense, he has no real importance whatsoever. Far more important is Paolo Farina looking all about him, like a man who's just stumbled, to see who's noticed his wife's defection; or Lina Chiari carrying her new doctor's name in her purse like a saint's medal; or Rosalia de Credo's worshipful love of her sister Angiola who has never given her a thought. As Clement Roux says:

> I have a friend who's director of the orchestra at La Scala. He told me that when they need crowd noises, the sounds of rebellion, people howling for or against, what have you, they get deep voices to sing from the wings one single beautiful, highly sonorous word: *rubarbara*. In rounds . . . *barbararu* . . . *bararubar* . . . *rarubarba*. See what I mean? Well, politics, whether of the left or the right, it's *rubarbara* for me, my boy.

For Marguerite Yourcenar, of course, it's far more than "rubarbara." Her novel takes an emphatic, anti-Fascist political stance. But what lingers after the end of *A Coin in Nine Hands* is the shadowiness and puppetlike vagueness of the Dictator, and the compelling specificity of the so-called "common" people revolving all around him.

ANNE TYLER

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

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THE WITCHING HOUR

Entertaining Satan: Witchcraft and the Culture of Early New England by John Putnam Demos

(Oxford University Press, 543 pp., $25)

If the legal record is to be believed, seventeenth-century New England was awash in witchcraft. From the indictment of Jane Hawkins in 1638 to the trial of Winifred Benham in 1697, nearly three hundred New Englanders were accused as witches, and more than thirty hanged. Per capita, New England generated more witchcraft prosecutions than Old England or the Continent in these years.

As metaphor, literary theme, and popular-culture grist, this dark corner of our history exerts a continuing hold on our imagination. From the "anti-popery" crusades of the 1830s to McCarthyism of more recent memory, a wide range of paranoid political movements have been labeled "witch hunts." Writers from Nathaniel Hawthorne and Emily Dickinson to Arthur Miller and Stephen King have found in New England witchcraft fertile ground for exploring the many guises of evil. This metaphorical and fictional exploitation has often done violence to the historical reality—most notoriously in Arthur Miller's play about Salem witchcraft, *The Crucible*. As Robert Warshow pointed out in *Commentary* as early as 1953, Miller's anti-McCarthyite parable egregiously distorts its ostensible subject.

Further obscuring the history of witchcraft, many of its would-be interpreters have viewed it through the distorting lens of their own cultural preoccupations. One of the earliest, a Boston merchant of the early 1700s named Robert Calef, mainly wanted to discredit Cotton Mather, and many later critics of "Puritanism" have grossly exaggerated the clergy's role in witchcraft prosecutions. By contrast, during the nineteenth-century heyday of Spiritualism, the witchcraft record was often seen as further proof of communication from the Other Side. In our own day, along with Miller's play, we have had Marion Starkey's *The Devil in Massachusetts* (1949), which combines revulsion against the irrationalities of Nazism with a worried postwar concern about aimless, sexually repressed adolescents.

In 1976 a California psychologist theorized that the "afflicted girls" of Salem had actually been on a bad drug trip brought on by eating spoiled rye bread laced with ergot, an L.S.D.-like substance. Though quickly demolished by other psychologists, this bizarre theory had sufficient contemporary resonance to lead *The New York Times* to give it the kind of front-page coverage usually reserved for the economic pronouncements of Felix Rohatyn.

Into this fray bravely plunges John Putnam Demos, historian at Brandeis and descendant of a family that figured prominently in the Salem witchcraft outbreak of 1692. Though easily the best book on witchcraft published in years, *Entertaining Satan* is not without problems.

Demos immediately confronts a central difficulty. "New England witchcraft" had two distinct aspects: first, the succession of individual accusations and trials that sporadically plagued the region during the first two generations of settlement resulting in some 130 legal actions and sixteen executions; and, second, the famous Salem outbreak in which over 150 persons were jailed and nineteen hanged.

Protesting the overemphasis on Salem and its familiar cast of characters—saintly Rebecca Nurse, spiteful Bridget Bishop, stubborn Giles Corey, and the rest—and the neglect of the larger witchcraft history of the period, Demos amply redresses the imbalance: except for passing references to marginal figures and a few brief digressions, he ignores Salem. This radical solution has obvious advantages. Salem clearly diverged from the norm and veered off on a terrible trajectory of its own that raises unique interpretive problems. Its scale and intensity could easily swamp a larger study of which it was only a part. This decision frees Demos to explore less-familiar events and source materials. But it also has its drawbacks. Many themes in *Entertaining Satan* could have been enriched through more systematic attention to Salem; at other points, the Salem evidence might have suggested modifications of the interpretive schema.

But accepting this basic authorial decision, what manner of book do we have? First of all, except for a few present-tense vignettes, this is interpretive, not narrative, history. To Demos, the popular interest in witchcraft is "faintly like an embarrassment," and for the most part he determinedly avoids his topic's dramatic or "literary" possibilities to focus on underlying patterns and the ways in which these episodes illuminate the larger social history of the period.

THE BOOK's four major sections—"Biography," "Psychology," "Sociology," and "History"—sum up the major interpretive threads. The longest and most problematic is "Psychology." Here Demos offers an interpretation—or rather a multiplicity of interpretations—based on contemporary psychiatric theory. This approach is most successful when the focus is on a single individual, as in the interesting chapter on Elizabeth Knapp of Groton, Massachusetts, a young servant in the household of the Reverend Samuel Willard who in 1671-1672 underwent a frightening succession of physical torments that she, Willard, and the townspeople interpreted as satanic possession. In this "corporeal bomb, observed in the process of exploding," Demos sees massive rage directed both at herself and at her "clergyman-therapist" Willard. This in turn he interprets as Elizabeth's regression to a troubled early childhood marked by her father's humiliating trial for adultery and the death of a newborn brother that (so Demos suggests) "froze her infantile rage so as to make it inaccessible to the influence of subsequent experience."

Demos is at his best on the level of immediate experience. Patiently, sensitively, almost lovingly, he unravels the tangled lives of obscure folk like Elizabeth Knapp, forgotten except for their brief moment in the limelight. Only those who have toiled in New England's mountainous genealogical records or puzzled over the crabbed orthography and archaic constructions of seventeenth-century court depositions can fully appreciate Demos's achievement at this level, where a short biographical sketch may reflect days of hard work.

But these individual case studies have

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presumably been selected precisely because they "fit" a particular psychological interpretation. How *generally* useful are these models? When Demos moves from the specific to the abstract, doubts arise. Since middle-aged women, girls, and young men figured disproportionately as accused witches or accuser/victims, we are given exhaustive discussions of the psychoanalytic literature as it relates to menopausal behavior; the oedipal drive in young males; and narcissistic transference in adolescent girls experiencing "a powerful regressive pull toward the 'pre-oedipal mother' " and "pathogenic conflicts [that] are typically 'pregenital' . . . [with] a deep 'oral' substrate." For pages on end, witchcraft is hardly mentioned at all as a vast body of clinical writing is surveyed, including the eight forms of intrapsychic defense and the eight "primary affects" behind all emotional experience according to current psychological theory.

Demos's grasp of this theoretical literature is awesome, and his efforts to apply it to his subject are always thoughtful and carefully explained. Yet the end result is speculative in the extreme. In a single two-paragraph passage, for example, we encounter "probably," "perhaps" (twice), "would be," "it seems," "one imagines," "may have," "must have" (twice), "might well have," "might have been," "Is it incautious to imagine. . . ?," and "Is it unreasonable to think. . . ?"

IS IT INCAUTIOUS to suggest that the evidence is sometimes *over*-interpreted? Economic considerations would seem sufficient to explain the prominence of sick and dead cattle in the witchcraft testimony of these subsistence farmers. But to Demos, this also suggests a "larger paradigm": that for the young man struggling with oedipal conflicts, cows had a "special and symbolic significance" subconsciously linked with infantile gratification received at his mother's breast. "Perhaps there was even a kind of identification, a sense of sharing that blurred the species-boundary." Well, perhaps.

In developing these psychological interpretations, Demos treads carefully around the issues raised by some feminist scholars who have sought to incorporate witchcraft studies within a larger framework of women's history. He rejects the simplistic view that "witches" were protofeminists courageously defying the patriarchy. (The macabre account of the good women of Fairfield, Connecticut, pawing and tugging at the corpse of a woman just hanged as a witch, looking for the dread "witch's tit," is a useful antidote to any simplistic division of victims and oppressors along gender lines.) That 75 percent of the accused witches were female, he says, reflects a transcultural pattern of misogyny. This he explains in terms of Dorothy Dinnerstein's *The Mermaid and the Minotaur* (1976), which traces the deepest feelings and psychic conflicts of both men and women to the primal fact that for nearly everyone the earliest physical and emotional interactions are with a woman.

Hovering over this work is the intellectual presence of Erik Erikson, whose studies in the developmental stages of the human life cycle have clearly influenced Demos profoundly. "One point seems immediately apparent," he rather sadly observes of these peasant folk of the 1600s, "midlife was *not* seen as one of several stages in a fully rounded 'life cycle.' " If only they could have read Gail Sheehy's *Passages*, with perhaps a bracing dose of Christopher Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism*, he often seems on the verge of suggesting, all this unpleasantness could have been avoided.

WITH disarming regularity, Demos acknowledges that his terminology may seem "excessively abstract, even obfuscating"; that he is offering "a *potpourri* of interpretive deduction"; and that in applying current psychiatric concepts to persons long dead he is building "a long and admittedly shaky bridge." Yet for all the disclaimers, the abstractions multiply, the deductions proliferate, and the shaky bridges stretch so far that one finds oneself occasionally wondering if one is on a bridge at all, or an intricately curved spiral doubling back on itself. Judgments about this section will surely vary, reflecting each reader's view of the craft of history and the general utility of psychoanalytic theory in illuminating past behavior.

Abruptly shifting gears on page 210, Demos introduces a quite different explanatory mode: sociology. With mercifully few forays into contemporary sociological theory, Demos now simply explores, with great historical insight, the subtle relationship of witchcraft accusations to the larger patterns of social life in these communities. His central point, amply documented, is that these accusations did not arise in a void; they "be-

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longed to the regular business of life." Often a woman (almost always of the poorer ranks) was the object of witchcraft suspicion and gossip for years—sometimes decades. For gossip to be translated into legal action, he suggests, elite involvement was essential. Elizabeth Garlick of Easthampton, Long Island, for example, was long suspected but not finally prosecuted until accused by the dying daughter-in-law of a local notable.

Even recognizing that a book like this inevitably gives a distorted picture of life in colonial New England, one nevertheless emerges from this "Sociology" section sighing in relief that one did not actually have to live in these gossip-ridden, mean-spirited, endlessly litigious, and generally rather nasty villages. "Our differences have been so long and tedious," reported one town official in 1646, "as that they even make our spirits to droop under them." For all its drawbacks, modern life has it points.

IN THE FINAL SECTION, "History," Demos links the fluctuating rhythms of witchcraft prosecutions to the Indian wars, natural disasters, religious controversies, French dangers, and land-title disputes that also agitated New England in these years. At their peak, he suggests, these other problems absorbed the surplus social energy, and witchcraft prosecutions diminished; when other threats waned (though leaving a residue of bitterness or anxiety) and witchcraft accusations revived. This ingenious and persuasive interpretation underscores the point Demos makes earlier in the sociology section: that New England witchcraft must be viewed within its larger social context. This might seem trite to anthropologists who have studied tribal witchcraft, but it is an insight that historians, sharing the popular fascination with the drama of the outbreaks themselves, and perhaps still influenced by the antiquarian's preoccupation with the exceptional and the unusual, have been slow to grasp.

In our own work on Salem witchcraft, Stephen Nissenbaum and I concluded that the event is best understood in the context or larger social and economic changes, and numerous recent scholars of British and continental witchcraft—Keith Thomas, Alan Macfarlane, Norman Cohn, Erik Midelfort, E. William Monter, and others—have made the same point. Now John Demos, too, persuasively demonstrates the "imbededness" of witchcraft within the larger culture. This is the historical sensibility at its best: free of jargon, not overly dependent on a priori models, combining painstaking research and soaring imaginative leaps to recreate the very texture of life in an era so alien to our own.

EVEN TO THE END, however, questions persist. How, precisely, do Demos's three major interpretative approaches relate to each other? Each seems relatively freestanding, and it is almost as though we are being left to choose whichever suits our taste. And, with the interpretive possibilities so freely proliferating, it is surprising how little attention is given to witchcraft as a comprehensive *belief system*. As Demos says, the folk culture of witchcraft and the effort of intellectuals to rationalize and systematize it were very different realities, but both were important. At all intellectual and social levels, witch belief was part of the seventeenth century's cosmology, supported by the Bible, the Common Law, and a shelf full of learned treatises. To neglect this side of the story is to miss an opportunity to examine from a functionalist perspective the interaction of theology, jurisprudence, and popular culture in a particularly volatile context.

Where, then, does all this leave us? Unquestionably, *Entertaining Satan* is a serious and important book. In shedding new light on the "other" New England witchcraft, it also illuminates the larger contours of early American social history. It gathers strength as it moves along, and even in the early sections, where the preoccupation with psychological theory seems excessive, the speculations are always interesting and provocative. Throughout one has the sense of a strong and humane intelligence struggling to impose coherence on the tangled and recalcitrant raw material of the past. The history of witchcraft is at last being reclaimed by the historians, and John Demos has contributed significantly to that process.

PAUL BOYER

Paul Boyer teaches American intellectual history at the University of Wisconsin in Madison and is co-author, with Stephen Nissenbaum, of *Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft* (Harvard University Press).

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TRB, *from page 4*

night sessions: "We started Tuesday night. It was 2:30 in the morning. Next, 2:30 in the morning. Next was all night . . . and [Friday] 11:00. And this morning [December 19] it was 3:30. It's not a good way to legislate."

Exactly. It's good neither for politicos (although the House did give itself a little Christmas gift of a 15 percent salary raise) nor for the public. Stronger political parties would help. Party discipline has been ebbing in America. You can see it in the steady drop in voting and in the rise of special interest groups and PACs.

We don't have the great issues of former times—slavery in the 1850s, poverty and hunger in the 1930s—but we do have the plight of farmers and idle city workers. There are twenty million unemployed, with one family in three personally affected. The times cry out for organized parties to articulate emotions. If the parties don't channel it, the turmoil is likely to erupt in the streets. James Sundquist says: "The last period of polarization, when the current alignment of the two-party system was shaped, is almost half a century old, and the Democratic and Republican symbols have lost much of the meaning and appeal they possessed." Is some kind of "sustained crisis" needed to arouse the people? There was confusion rather than coherent protest here last week. It is doubtful if any other government could operate such a divisive system. In the last seven elections (1956 through 1980) voters elected a Democratic House each time, a Democratic Senate in all except the last, and three Republican Presidents. More than half the time government was divided. No wonder the BBC has difficulty.

President Reagan, the great communicator, holds fewer press conferences than recent predecessors. F.D.R. had two a week; Reagan has held fourteen in two years, plus shorter meetings on an impromptu basis. Often he utters memorable one-liners; often his facts are wrong. Question time in the parliamentary system is a two-way process; an alert chief executive learns as much from the questions as the public does from the answers. Recently the President has given five-minute radio broadcasts once a week (without questions), and, on December 15, a live interview to six broadcast organizations. The tone here is one of affable geniality. The press likes Reagan. With Congress gone perhaps they will see him more.

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CHILE DIARIST

The New Song

A TOURIST VISITING Santiago for the first time today might never suspect that the country had been turned inside out within the last decade. The machine-gun toting troops that were stationed on every street corner five years ago are no longer visible unless one knows where to look. Repairs on La Moneda, the presidential palace that was bombed during the 1973 coup, have been completed, and the red station wagons of the secret police are no longer parked ostentatiously outside the palace. The upper-class neighborhoods, inching up the foothills of the Andes, have experienced a building boom in the last decade. In Santiago's commercial center, the parks are neatly manicured and the streets are clean. Dictatorships are good at that sort of thing.

CHILEANS NO LONGER whisper at the bus stops, and their faces are no longer drawn in fear and anger. The children of the 1980s will not learn from the history books what was won and lost by their parents. In the shantytowns, where many children do not have the luxury of attending school, parents tell anti-Pinochet jokes, but they send the children out of the room. For the generations that had known freedom and had come to take it for granted, anger becomes sullenness, depression; raw fear becomes intimidation. Those who remain defiant learn how to identify the edge of permissible criticism. The military regime, too, has become more discriminating, more sophisticated, more effective.

A JOURNALIST HARBORS a larger-than-life-size portrait of the martyred Socialist President Salvador Allende in his living room. The authorities, he says, know who he is and what he does. Should they decide that his reports have become an intolerable threat, the portrait would be the least of his problems. A priest who used to teach at the University of Chile was purged two years ago. He continues to teach and to do research at an institute established by the Catholic Church, but the students are mostly foreign and the research findings have a short distribution list. The highly reputable research institute, FLACSO, spawned by the United Nations, continues, with the assistance of U.S. and Western European foundations, to maintain a Chilean branch. FLACSO's scholars are no longer regularly harassed. They can present their papers at international conferences, but the Chilean public is shielded from their findings unless a journalist dares to make oblique reference to them.

WHAT WAS KNOWN IN CHILE during the Allende years, and among musicians in exile after September 1973, as *la nueva cancion* has reappeared as *el canto nuevo* (both mean "the new song"), though the lyrics are now more subtle. It is even possible to buy some of the records of Victor Jara, one of Pinochet's early victims—a measure of the regime's newfound self-confidence. Poets, novelists, playwrights, and cinematographers continue to produce works for the dissident intelligentsia. Last August the prestigious Teatro La Comedia showed a new movie based on a story by José Donoso. The movie was a work of protest, but the message, a humorous condemnation of consumerism, was so subtle that the uninitiated would never have recognized it as such. Chilean intellectuals know that anything more pointed is certain to be closed down on opening night.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, though hardly revolutionary, is still on the cutting ege of resistance to the regime. As the only institution that cannot be crushed outright, it has remained the refuge of last resort for the dissident and the devastated. There are several human rights organizations in Chile now, but the most prominent is still the Church's Vicaría de la Solidaridad. Pinochet frowns upon the Vicaría's activities, and its leaders and sympathizers are closely watched by the Chilean secret police. Political arrests are less frequent than they were during the first few years following the Pinochetazo, although the appearance last summer of the mutilated body of a labor leader was a stark reminder that, above all, the regime will not countenance effective labor organization.

IF THE POLITICAL ORDER is virtually a nonissue in Chile today, the same cannot be said of the economic order. Bankruptcies have been a common occurrence since 1973, when Milton Friedman's "Chicago Boys," Chileans who returned home to implement their mentor's monetarist policies, virtually eliminated protective tariffs. But by mid-1982 the malaise had reached into the largest national industries and banks, and the only class that still has a voice was complaining bitterly. Inflation has been temporarily arrested, but unemployment has climbed sharply since late 1981. Official figures for mid-1982 were 21 percent in Santiago and 25 to 30 percent elsewhere. But such figures would not include the approximately 4.5 percent of the labor force working at considerably less than minimum wage on the government's minimum employment program, nor the workers who had been blacklisted for union or political activity, nor the large body of marginal workers, who have rarely held steady jobs.

AT EVERY STREET CORNER, the visitor is set upon by throngs of peddlers attempting to sell candy bars and chewing gum, lottery tickets and shoelaces. But it is hard to imagine that these peddlers could earn enough to feed themselves. A skilled carpenter who could not afford the expensive peddlers' license told me that the police had confiscated his wares, and he had been heavily fined. A seamstress in La Victoria, one of Santiago's largest shantytowns, tried to open a business in her home. She had to wait six months for a visit by a municipal inspector, who told her that her premises were too primitive to qualify. The license fee was not returned, and she was later fined for not having filed an income tax return for her nonexistent business.

CHILE'S POOR are neither fatalistic nor naive. But there are no unions, no political parties, no courts available to them. There is only the Church, and it is overwhelmed and closely watched. Chile's journalists, scholars, clergymen, and human rights activists continue to gather evidence of the outrage being perpetrated against their people, even though most of them no longer believe that getting their message to the outside world will make a difference. The Reagan Administration, for one, is trying to persuade Congress that human rights in Chile are now secure, and that American military assistance should be resumed.

JAN KNIPPERS BLACK

Jan Knippers Black teaches political science at the University of New Mexico, and is the author of *United States Penetration of Brazil* (University of Pennsylvania Press).

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

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

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"It may be the turn of the centu before it becomes commercial. B it's an attractive idea. Hydrogen from a gallon of water has about half as much energy as there is in a gallon of gasoline.

"Hydrogen can be made into liquid or gaseous fuel. It can be tra mitted long distances more chea than electricity. And when hydrog burns, it's converted back into wat Very tidy."

At Gulf, our first priority is to all the oil and natural gas we can of resources right here in Ameri But we're working on a lot of oth ideas, too. Thermochemical wate splitting is just one of them. Becau basically the business we are in i energy for tomorrow.

Gulf

Gulf people: energy for tomorro

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